Augusta Georgia Divorce Lawyer - Evans GA Family Attorney

Georgia Divorce Overview

2010-10-30T13:13:00.002-04:00

Georgia Divorce Overview: Augusta GA Divorce Lawyer

Most couples do everything that they can to work out their differences before parting ways, but when a divorce becomes necessary, one should always retain the services of an experienced Georgia divorce attorney. There are many factors that need to be considered when a couple is going through divorce proceedings, and sometimes the emotion surrounding the event can lead to decisions that may prove to be regrettable later on. Your lawyer will assist you in wading through the details and assist in drafting a amicable divorce settlement agreement if it is at all possible.

If both parties are agree that a divorce is the best course of action and neither is attempting to place the blame on the other, Georgia divorce law allows for a no-fault divorce. There are also divorce proceedings that do in fact claim fault, and there are a total of twelve different fault grounds. These include instances of adultery, abuse, marriage between related individuals, impotence as of the marriage date, mental issues, fraud or force, criminal acts, and certain substance abuse problems.
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2010-10-11T08:43:00.002-04:00

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Spousal support in an Augusta Georgia divorce - All you wanted to know

2010-08-10T10:56:00.002-04:00

Spousal support in an Augusta Georgia divorce - All you wanted to know

Alimony can be given permanently. It serves to "get people back on their feet" after a divorce. Although alimony is generally reserved for longer marriages and/or when one spouse earns a lot more than the other, it is not always the case. Alimony is generally depends on the paying spouse's ability to pay and the receiving spouse's need for support.
Periodic spousal support refers to alimony payments made at pre-determined times for a pre-determined amount of time.
Lump sum alimony is a one-time payment of alimony, made payable in a lump sum. Sometimes the law treats lump sum spousal support as property division, which might affect its tax status. If you're going to make or receive a lump sum payment of spousal support, seek advice from a lawyer.

Permanent maintenance is the payment of alimony for the duration of the payee's life, made in monthly or weekly payments.

Rehabilitative alimony is intended for rehabilitating the other spouse for a pre-determined period of time.

You must to consider the tax consequences of whatever kind of spousal support you select. Generally, spousal support is tax-deductible for the paying spouse, and taxable income for the receiving spouse. But, again, lump-sum spousal support alimony is often more complicated. Even if it costs a little bit to hire a lawyer, it might be well worth the expense.

Our lawyers are based in Augusta, GA (Georgia) and help clients in Augusta, GA (Georgia) and throughout the CSRA, including Columbia County, Richmond County, Lincoln County, McDuffie, Jefferson and Burke Counties, Evans, Appling, Waynesboro, Louisville, Thomson, Lincolnton, Girard Georgia & Aiken, SC & North Augusta SC

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Augusta GA Military Divorce Lawyer - Will the Residence Have to Be Sold When You are Divorcing?

2010-07-28T09:09:00.001-04:00

Will the Residence Have to Be Sold When You are Divorcing?

The splitting of real estate is usually one of the most significant troubles in a divorce. Each spouse could have possessed real estate before the union, and after that the spouses may have bought additional property, such as a marital home, following getting wedded. In case the divorcing spouses don't trust each other on how the home is to be split, a court must split the house among them.

Usually, the home possessed by a spouse just before marriage could be the spouse's separate or nonmarital house following marriage. The residence that the spouses procure right after matrimony is community property in the community property state and it is marital property in an equitable distribution state. Nevertheless, individual residence may become community or marital property in the course of the wedding, based upon how it's used.

In the separation case, the court will normally put aside the individual property to the owning spouse and after that divide the marital property in an equal or honest way among the partners. Equitable division is the most popular sort of property division, as well as the legal courts take many things into consideration in reaching a conclusion. These elements contain the conduct of the parties throughout the separation plus each spouse's part in acquiring, preserving and also increasing the value of the property.

What Happens to the Marital House?

The main house of the husband and wife is known as the marital residence. It's generally the most treasured asset bought during the wedding. It's also the center of family life. Ownership as well as utilization of the house can have a significant influence on the emotional development of family members, especially young youngsters. As a result, what occurs to the marital house in a separation is generally of great concern.

There are numerous options for discarding of the marital house:

Distribution deferred. In a breakup case, the trial court might grant one of the partners the exclusive authority to utilize and occupy the marital residence after the divorce is final. This authority is known as ''exclusive possession.'' Exclusive possession persists until a particular period, for instance when the children of the marriage reach majority, or until a particular occasion, for example when the husband or wife in ownership remarries or passes away. There might be other conditions imposed, such as the non-occupying spouse paying for the loan and maintenance, as well as the proceeds of sale being distributed between the partners when the home is sold.

Distributive shares awarded. Both partners in the breakup might be given a distributive share in the marital residence. This kind of an award can be given by:

Giving every spouse a share of the spouses' total interest in the house
Awarding the marital residence to one of the spouses on condition that he or she makes up the other partner for his or her distributive portion
Awarding individual ownership of the marital house to one of the partners for a specified period, right after which the residence is to be sold and the earnings distributed according to a pre-established method
Directing an instant sale of the marital residence along with a distribution of the net proceeds according to a formula chosen by the judge

Distribution to one spouse. The court may give overall ownership of the marital residence to either husband or wife as portion of the house distribution, provided the residence qualifies for distribution as ''marital'' or ''community'' property. In deciding whether or not to award the residence to one spouse, the legal courts typically take into consideration the following things:

Age as well as health of the spouses; length of marriage
Every partner's contributions towards the matrimony
Income as well as belongings of each spouse
Expertise as well as employability of each spouse
Origin of residence or funds for residence
Custody of under 18 children
Relationship misconduct of the partners

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Divorce Attorney News - Halftime: Norman and Evert land in the rough

2010-07-28T09:07:00.000-04:00

Halftime: Norman and Evert land in the rough

The Greg Norman-Chris Evert marriage hasn't been designated for divorce court yet, but at the moment it ranks with some of the worst free agent signings ever.

After announcing they have separated, Norman is in San Francisco to captain the International team in the Presidents Cup. Evert is home in Florida, where a photog snapped a shot of the tennis legend's unadorned ring finger, just 15 months after the couple laid out $2 million for a wedding ceremony.

That's chump change compared to the $103 million it cost Norman to divorce his wife of 26 years, Laura Andrassy. She's proving that no one laughs a last laugh harder than a ditched ex, telling the Sydney Sunday Telegraph:
"They say opposites attract. Here were two people very much alike -- high profile and narcissistic people -- and that would make a relationship difficult . . . Both he and Chris are adults and they were supposed to know what they were doing, but they were in the throes of lust and weren't thinking . . . But being with Chris is what Greg wanted. Well, he got it."
A British tabloid, The Mirror, says Evert wasn't happy about moving into Norman's Jupiter Island estate, where he had lived with Andrassy. If true, we can understand that. When living in a $60 million Florida mansion, you want to be the one who picked out the wall paper, right?
Evert's split from two-time Winter Olympian Andy Mill cost her a settlement of $8 million and a $4.6 million home in Aspen.

Good luck to Norman at the Presidents Cup, but I'm guessing the mind of the Great White Shark will be on how many dead presidents have been wasted during this short-sighted lark. (2008 photo by Jeff Bassett/AP/Canadian Press)

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How to choose an Augusta Georgia Divorce Lawyer

2010-07-28T09:06:00.000-04:00

How to choose a Georgia Divorce Lawyer in Augusta GA

It is crucial that you choose the ideal attorney to advise you in your GA military divorce case. Not choosing the right lawyer can make a painful experience significantly worse for you.

Military divorce is a part of Georgia family law. In Georgia, domestic relation laws are complex. It is different from other laws. Hence choose an attorney who specializes in Georgia family law.

To choose an attorney, you should follow the same procedures you would do when making any purchase. look around, seek references and interview the attorney. The internet, the Yellow pages, your county law library and bar association, Attorney directories and websites are good places to begin the search.

Speak with several lawyers and narrow down the law firms you think will be able to represent you and your divorce case. Speak with each of the short listed attorneys and determine if they are available for a consultation to go over your family law situation, and what the fee schedule would be for this consultation.

Ask for any information available on the lawyer. Ask questions about what to expect in your case. Remember what you are told This is the time for comparison shopping on law firms.

Weigh the background and skills of one attorney with the others before you hire the attorney. Ask about the results each of the law firms have obtained for clients who needed the same kind of services. Be certain that you find answers to the following questions:

-If the attorney has experience with your kind of case?
-Is the fee on an hourly basis or a flat fee and what does the fee cover?
-Is there a contract describing fees and services provided for the fees?
-If you or a loved one are facing a GA separation case in Georgia, then call our lawyers now.

Our aggressive Evans GA law firm handle custody cases in the following GA areas: Richmond County, Columbia County, Augusta, Evans, Martinez, Grovetown, Waynesboro, Thomson, Girard, Lincolnton, McDuffie County, and Jefferson County.

PJ Campanaro is an Augusta GA divorce lawyer & Georgia Military Divorce Lawyer. Augusta military divorce lawyer - Georgia military divorce attorney.

Military Divorce - Female airmen, caregivers split up the most

2009-10-05T09:40:00.000-04:00

Military Divorce
Female airmen, caregivers split up the most
By Erik Holmes - Staff writer

Posted at http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/09/airforce_divorce_091909w/

Sunday Sep 20, 2009 9:20:35 EDT

Forget everything you thought you knew about marriage and divorce in the Air Force. Most of it isn’t true.

Airmen in career fields with the highest deployment tempos don’t get divorced more than those who spend most of their time at home station. Fighter jocks, supposed playboys, actually get divorced less than the force as a whole. And those whose job is to care for others — nurses, social workers, family support center staff and educators — have the hardest time staying married.

As of August, 70.9 percent of officers and 56.3 percent of enlisted were married, and 4.4 percent of active-duty officers and 7.3 percent of enlisted airmen were divorced.

Among adults in the general population, 50.5 percent were married and 10.5 percent were divorced as of 2007, the latest year for which data is available from the U.S. Census Bureau.

An analysis by Air Force Times of the service’s marriage and divorce statistics turned up surprising conclusions. Many defy easy explanation.

* Female airmen are two to three times more likely than male airmen to be divorced and are less likely to be married. Among active-duty officers, 3.1 percent of men and 10 percent of women are divorced. For enlisted, the numbers are 5.8 percent of men and 13.1 percent of women.

* Officer career fields with both the highest and lowest percentages of divorce are tied to health care. Physicians generally are the least likely to be divorced, and nurses, physician assistants and health care administrators the most likely. Operating room nurses have the highest percentage of divorce, 15.6 percent.

* Some enlisted career fields with the lowest divorce percentages are those most heavily deployed — pararescue; survival, evasion, resistance and escape; tactical air control party; and security forces. Those with the highest percentages include the fields of education and training, paralegal, personnel, family support center and military training instructor.

The reasons for divorce among airmen are myriad, said Chaplain (Maj.) David Carr, the marriage and family coordinator in the resource division of the Chaplain Corps College, co-located with the Army Chaplain School at Fort Jackson, S.C. But a major factor, he said, is a misunderstanding of what marriage should be and how much work it involves.

“A lot of folks just have this feeling that love should be a natural thing,” Carr said, “and when the love stops then the marriage must end, rather than thinking ... love is going to be up and down and ... it needs to be maintained.”

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Alexandra Gonzalez-Waddington is an Augusta GA divorce lawyer & Georgia Military Divorce Lawyer Augusta Georgia domestic mediator. She is an Augusta military divorce lawyer - Georgia military divorce attorney GA child custody attorney , and Augusta Georgia child support attorney. She offers mediation for divorce, child custody, and child support.

Divorce News - Greg Norman and Chris Evert split after 15 months

2009-10-03T18:45:00.000-04:00

Greg Norman and Chris Evert split after 15 months

By Carly Crawford, AP

Herald SunOctober 03, 2009 12:58pm

Greg Norman and Chris Evert have separated 15 months after their lavish Bahamas wedding

Married for only 15 months. Norman paid $115m in first divorce
GREG Norman is staring down the barrel of a second expensive divorce after his shock split from tennis legend Chris Evert.

The couple, famous for their public displays of affection, are separating just 15 months after their lavish wedding in the Bahamas, the Herald Sun reports.

Their representatives dropped the bombshell late yesterday in the US saying in a statement the pair had agreed to "formally separate".

"The decision is a result of a great deal of consideration," it said.

"The two have not indicated whether they intend to divorce."

The couple married after Norman's ugly split from his previous wife Laura Andrassy, the mother of his two adult children, Greg and Morgan.

Norman, 54, and Andrassy settled their split in a deal that delivered her $US100 million ($115 million).

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Alexandra Gonzalez-Waddington is an Augusta GA divorce lawyer & Georgia Military Divorce Lawyer Augusta Georgia domestic mediator. She is an Augusta military divorce lawyer - Georgia military divorce attorney GA child custody attorney , and Augusta Georgia child support attorney. She offers mediation for divorce, child custody, and child support.

Child Custody battles can become a rude ‘welcome home’ for military parents

2009-09-21T09:17:00.002-04:00

Child Custody battles can become a rude ‘welcome home’ for military parents

September 6, 2009

Courtesy of Staff Sgt. Jessica Tolbe

WASHINGTON — When Staff Sgt. Jessica Tolbe returned from Iraq in February, she looked forward to catching up on lost time with her sons.

But when she went to pick them up from her ex-husband, she was blocked from seeing them by a court order issued while she was still overseas.

“You’d think common sense would make a judge ask ‘Has the mother been served; does she know what’s going on?’ before changing the custody rules,” the Hawaii-based soldier said. “But apparently not.”

House lawmakers for the last few years have been fighting unsuccessfully for better protections for military parents who are deployed and again this summer passed legislation to prohibit courts from making custody changes while a servicemember is overseas.

But it’s unlikely to become law, congressional officials said, because of the Defense Department’s continued opposition to the measure.

Meanwhile, family law experts say they continue to see hundreds of cases in which troops finishing combat rotations return home to angry custody battles and unsympathetic judges, who see long tours overseas as an obstacle to providing a stable home for children.

“The court system is still stacked against members of the military who deploy,” said Mathew Tully, whose legal practice specializes in military rights cases. “A little common sense is coming into the system now, but it is still horrible.”

Attorneys for Tolbe’s ex-husband say they’ll argue in court that his petition for custody of their sons — 8-year-old Jackson and 10-year-old Jordan — has nothing to do with her time deployed, instead centering on matters of stability and who can best provide for the children.

But Tolbe believes the courts in Hawaii and Tennessee never would have allowed the moves if she was in country to fight against them.

“I should never have been in this situation,” she said. “I may lose my children, and all because I had to leave them to go to Iraq.”

Ongoing battles

The military does not keep statistics on how many troops are involved in custody fights, but Army records show more than 20,000 troops in the ranks last year were single parents.

That’s nearly one in every 16 soldiers whose off-duty hours are spent raising children alone, and in some cases fighting with former spouses about how best to do it.

Two years ago, Congress extended parts of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act to military child custody cases, prohibiting judgments against parents while they are deployed and allowing more time for returning troops to respond to such challenges.

But those changes don’t always include legal challenges like the one Tolbe faced, where a temporary custody order was issued and amended. Tully, himself a Guardsman, said another hurdle is that different states have different standards for custody cases, and not all of them are military friendly.

“I had a case two years ago where the judge wanted my client to swear that he wasn’t going to be deployed again if he were to get joint custody of his child,” he said. “The judge told me, ‘I don’t care about the father, I care about the child.’ ”

Rep. Mike Turner, R-Ohio, has pushed for the last four years for rules that would reset any temporary custody orders upon a servicemember’s return to the States, in order to protect military parents’ rights.

“(Defense) Secretary (Robert) Gates has said he doesn’t want service to your country to be a disadvantage to families,” he said. “In this, they’re becoming disadvantaged.”

Language that would forbid courts from altering any existing custody agreement while a military parent is deployed and set an end for temporary orders was included in the House version of the 2010 Defense Authorization Bill.

But similar proposals have been ignored by the Senate for the last four years. Turner said that’s due to opposition from the Defense Department officials, who have told lawmakers that it should be an issue handled by individual states.

But at the Pentagon, officials say they’ve taken no stance on the matter, although they have categorized the number of families affected by deployment custody battles as a small fraction of the total force.

This spring, Turner confronted Gates on the issue during a House Armed Services Committee hearing, and received a promise that he would confirm that military officials aren’t blocking the bill. Months later, Turner said he still hasn’t received any response or support for the proposal.

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Alexandra Gonzalez-Waddington is an Augusta GA divorce lawyer & Georgia Military Divorce Lawyer Augusta Georgia domestic mediator. She is an Augusta military divorce lawyer - Georgia military divorce attorney GA child custody attorney , and Augusta Georgia child support attorney. She offers mediation for divorce, child custody, and child support.

Augusta GA Military Divorce Lawyer - Critics of ex-spouse protection act feuding

2009-09-15T23:27:00.000-04:00

Augusta GA Military Divorce Lawyer - Critics of ex-spouse protection act feuding

By Rick Maze - Staff writer - Army Times

Like a bickering couple headed for divorce, war has broken out among organizations that want Congress to amend the 1981 law that allows a court to divide military retired pay between a husband and wife.

The ongoing fight involves attempts to change the Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act, a law that allows state courts to award a portion of military retired pay to a nonmilitary spouse as part of a property settlement after divorce.

Over the 2½ decades the law has been in effect, service members and retirees have lobbied Congress to repeal or significantly gut the retirement-splitting provisions, while ex-spouses have pushed equally hard to keep the property settlement rules.

A new effort is under way after Rep. Lee Terry, R-Neb., tentatively agreed to introduce a bill that would make changes in the law requested by military retirees and divorced service members. A six-term lawmaker who never served in the military, but whose congressional district includes Offutt Air Force Base, Terry agreed to introduce a bill if he can find a Democrat to be a co-sponsor.

The long-smoldering feud among military associations revolves around what an updated law should include.

On one side is a Texas-based organization, the USFSPA Liberation Support Group, that wants a major change that would cancel retired pay to the ex-spouse who remarries, an issue that has long been a sore point for divorced military retirees.

On the other side is the Military Coalition, a group of more than 30 military-related associations, which believes including a remarriage provision would doom the legislation because it would be a too-radical change in the original law that essentially treats retired pay as marital property.

Terry’s office has announced no decision on whether to include a remarriage termination provision for retirement-pay splitting in his bill, but aides confirmed that meetings are planned on Former Spouse Protection Act legislation.

In an Aug. 29 statement about the possible legislation, ULSG leader Trish Pownall said Terry may not “grasp the fact that ex-spouses are being paid for life regardless of the circumstances.”

“Many ex-spouses make more money than we veterans do, [and] many others have remarried into a higher standard of living than we were ever able to provide for them,” she said.

Steve Strobridge, government relations director of the Military Officers Association of America, one of the coalition members, said MOAA is just trying to be realistic about what might pass.

“Some who have come more recently to the battle insist that the only solution is repeal or near-repeal of the USFSPA law. ... MOAA believes that no retired member is helped by holding out for a position that has no chance of success.”

Alexandra Gonzalez-Waddington is an Augusta GA divorce lawyer & Georgia Military Divorce Lawyer Augusta Georgia domestic mediator. She is an Augusta military divorce lawyer - Georgia military divorce attorney GA child custody attorney , and Augusta Georgia child support attorney. She offers mediation for divorce, child custody, and child support.

Augusta GA Child Custody Lawyer - Best Interest of the Child

2009-09-13T11:05:00.002-04:00

Best Interest of the Child
The best interest of the child is a standard used in family law to make decisions impacting a child in matters of adoption, child custody, guardianship, and visitation, among other issues. It is a subjective, discretionary test, in which all circumstances affecting the child are taken into account.

The following is an example of one's state's statute delaing with the best interest of the child:

"For purposes of shared parental responsibility and primary residence, the best interests of the child shall include an evaluation of all factors affecting the welfare and interests of the child, including, but not limited to:

the parent who is more likely to allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the nonresidential parent;
the love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parents and the child;
the capacity and disposition of the parents to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, and other remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in lieu of medical care, and other material needs;
the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity;
the permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home;
the moral fitness of the parents;
the mental and physical health of the parents;
the home, school, and community record of the child,
the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a preference;
the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent;
any other fact considered by the court to be relevant."

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Alexandra Gonzalez-Waddington is an Augusta GA divorce lawyer & Georgia Military Divorce Lawyer Augusta Georgia domestic mediator. She is an Augusta military divorce lawyer - Georgia military divorce attorney GA child custody attorney , and Augusta Georgia child support attorney. She offers mediation for divorce, child custody, and child support.

Augusta GA Military Divorce Lawyer - Custody battles and divorce in military families

2009-09-07T21:28:00.000-04:00

Augusta GA Military Divorce Lawyer - Custody battles and divorce in military families

by Dr. Erica Goodstone - Examiner.com

Marriage is a wonderful state. It can bring a sense a fulfillment, belonging, love and intimacy when both people enjoy their life together. Adding children can fully complete the picture. However, so many marriages exist with disharmony, disappointment, distress and tension. The additional stressors involved with parenting can tip a marriage into the danger zone. Marital difficulties and custody problems, as painful and emotionally wrenching as they sometimes are, can certainly be more easily handled when both partners live in the same home or nearby. But what if one person is in the military, deployed overseas for months or even years, and that person's spouse wants a divorce?

Dear John letters are not rare among military personnel. Custody battles and divorce are becoming more prevalent among military families. Spouses and intimate partners may not be happy living and funcitioning alone, separated by huge distances, having all the responsibility for child care, and not enjoying the romantic and intimate aspects of what they probably wanted in a marriage. A dissatisfied or estranged spouse may fight for custody of the the child or children.

An article in the Washington Post by Ann Scott Tyson, December 30, 2008, Deployment Used in Battle for Kids, brought this serious problem out into the open for discussion. She discovered that commanding officers often do not provide support or assistance for soldiers caught in this dilemma. Army regulations do allow a soldier to request an emergency leave due to problems at home, threat of divorce or child custody problems. However, the commanding officer has the ultimate power whether or not to grant approval of such a request.

More than 20 states have passed laws to limit the impact of deployment on ultimate custody decisions. For example, the state of Viriginia prevents any permanent change in custody to allowed while one spouse is deployed. There is no uniform plan nationawide that protects the rights of soldiers.

If you are personally dealing with such a painful relationship destroying situation, it is essential that you check out the precise laws in the state where you preside. Marriage and Family Therapists and Divorce Mediators are available to help couples deal with relationship and custody problems. However, when one partner is deployed thousands of miles away, living in sometimes very unpleasant conditions while risking his or her life to defend our country, the partner at home, living an ordinary life, can much more easily gain custody of their children.

Before rushing into court to fight for custody, it behooves the stay at home spouse of a deployed partner to seek personal counseling, gain some valuable insight, and discover whether there is a way to keep the marriage intact. It is also important for the courts to offer the equal rights to the military partner.

If you are currently dealing with such a difficult situation or you know someone who is, check out these sites.

Alexandra Gonzalez-Waddington is an Augusta GA divorce lawyer & Georgia Military Divorce Lawyer Augusta Georgia domestic mediator. She is an Augusta military divorce lawyer - Georgia military divorce attorney GA child custody attorney , and Augusta Georgia child support attorney. She offers mediation for divorce, child custody, and child support.

Augusta GA Military Divorce Lawyer - As suicides rise, military intensifies prevention efforts

2009-08-31T21:04:00.000-04:00

Augusta GA Military Divorce Lawyer - As suicides rise, military intensifies prevention efforts
Saturday, August 29, 2009

Brian Albrecht - Plain Dealer Reporter

The apparent suicide of Army Pvt. Keiffer Wilhelm comes at a time of heightened military and congressional scrutiny of increasing suicides in the armed forces.

The Army, with 128 suicides last year, already has 79 so far this year. The Navy had 41 last year and 28 this year. The Marines have 34, seven shy of last year, and the Air Force has recorded half its 40 suicides of 2008.

All the services have suicide prevention programs and are intensifying their efforts this year with new training and education.

The Army, with the highest number of suicides (20.2 per 100,000) - slightly more than the civilian suicide rate of 19.5 per 100,000 - recently launched a $50 million study of the problem for possible use of the results in treatment programs.

In testimony before Congress earlier this year, military officials said some reasons for suicides include the strain of multiple deployments, rising divorce rates and substance abuse.

Part of the current Army suicide-prevention training material addresses hazing and harassment - two elements embedded in military culture, experts say.

Four of Wilhelm's superiors face cruelty and maltreatment charges for their alleged mistreatment of him and four other soldiers.

Hazing in the military differs somewhat from its civilian counterpart, according to Hank Nuwer, author of several books on hazing.

In military hazing "there's the justification or rationalization that what you're putting people through is to make sure they can go through combat, be by your side and willing to do anything you ask," he said.

"This has come into the military culture as a good thing, a tradition best kept alive," he added. "The whole idea behind hazing is that if you can put up with this now, there will be times in your life when you're faced with similar hardships and you'll be able to get through them."

An Army spokesman said that while abuse in the case of Wilhelm and the other soldiers was clear, so far there is no direct connection that harassment caused Wilhelm's death.

Alexandra Gonzalez-Waddington is an Augusta GA divorce lawyer & Georgia Military Divorce Lawyer Augusta Georgia domestic mediator. She is an Augusta military divorce lawyer - Georgia military divorce attorney GA child custody attorney , and Augusta Georgia child support attorney. She offers mediation for divorce, child custody, and child support.

Military Divorce on the Rise - Troops' families feel weight of war

2009-08-27T23:18:00.000-04:00

Troops' families feel weight of war
Updated 8/4/2009

USA TODAY
MOUNTAIN VIEW, Calif. — If military families are quietly "coming apart at the seams," as the wife of the Army's top soldier told Congress in June, the evidence is here in the dining room of Army Capt. Mark Flitton and his wife, Lynn.
Their oldest child, Scott, 15, stormed into this room early this year after an argument with his father, asking why his mother ever married "that man." It was here in March where the couple first discussed divorce.

In July, Mark and Lynn explained at the dining room table how they live together now only on a superficial level, driven apart by back-to-back combat deployments and marking days until he goes back to war in Iraq next year.

"I haven't come home yet," admits Mark, 46, who during the past 10 years has spent a cumulative 36 months away in three separate tours. "I'm still in the war mode, and I don't know that I'm going to come out of it until I know I don't have any more war rotations to go back on."

"We've just become so comfortable in living separate lives," says Lynn, 49.

FIND MORE STORIES IN: Afghanistan | Iraq | Iraq War | Father | University of Denver
As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to demand long and multiple deployments of soldiers, the Army high command is focusing more attention on a tragic consequence to military families. Soldiers and their spouses are learning to live separate lives — the soldier at war, the spouse at home with the children — and it is becoming more difficult with each deployment to get back together.

WAR IN FOCUS: Marines fighting Taliban strive to win Afghan locals' trust
MORE: Bomber in Iraq kills 3 in latest attack
The Army's second in command, Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Chiarelli, says he learned of this during a tour this year of six Army installations hit hard by deployments.

"Spouses were telling me that their husbands were not reintegrating with the family," Chiarelli testified before a House subcommittee Wednesday. "They just realized that that was too hard to do in the short period of time they had (before returning to war) and they would back off from the family, which creates the relationship problems."

The Army is scrambling to address the issue, providing more counselors to help couples address their marital issues, expanding a program run by chaplains that offers marital therapy retreats. In an interview Monday, Chiarelli said he was encouraged by a pilot program creating online counseling services for soldiers and their families.

A crucial goal is to lengthen the time soldiers spend at home between deployments, he says.

Still, many fear that the damage done to marriages is lasting.

"What families are dealing with are the cumulative effects of nearly eight years of war ... effects (that) are not easily reversed," Sheila Casey, wife of Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Casey, told a Senate subcommittee in June.

Army documents and interviews with military families identify why communication between a soldier and his wife break down and problems ensue.

Husbands acquire stoic "survivor" instincts at war — the ability to control their emotions, for example — and bring these skills home. Wives who become experts in living independently struggle to relinquish power.

A soldier's depression or combat stress can make matters much worse, according to research published in February in the Journal of Clinical Psychology.

Statistics are showing a trend in broken military marriages.

The Pentagon says divorce rates among enlisted soldiers and Marines increased to about 4% in 2008, a full percentage point jump from when the Iraq war began. The civilian rate is 3.5%, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Researchers tracking 226 Army marriages at Fort Campbell, Ky., last year, found that 6% ended in divorce and that nearly 12% of the couples either became divorced or separated, according to results provided to USA TODAY.

Troops in combat who worry their marriages might be failing rose from one in four in 2005 to one in three in 2007, according to an Army study published last year that examined mental health issues plaguing combat troops. More than 250,000 active-duty soldiers are married.

War and separation is historically hard on families. Researchers, though, say a key feature of the current conflicts — the same troops being sent back to combat over and over again, rather than serving one tour and coming home to stay — may be further aggravating marriages.

Each time they are separated, couples say, holding the family together gets tougher.

Carol Herrick, 39, works with family support groups at Fort Sill, Okla., and says she struggles to reassemble her family each time her husband, Donald, a sergeant first class, comes home. He has left for Iraq or Korea four times in eight years.

"The more we do it," she says, "the harder it gets."

Continued at http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2009-08-03-broken-families_N.htm

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Alexandra Gonzalez-Waddington is an Augusta GA divorce lawyer & Georgia Military Divorce Lawyer Augusta Georgia domestic mediator. She is an Augusta military divorce lawyer - Georgia military divorce attorney GA child custody attorney , and Augusta Georgia child support attorney. She offers mediation for divorce, child custody, and child support.

Uncontested Divorce - Military Attorney

2009-08-25T17:02:00.000-04:00

CLOUGH v. RICHELO

Ellington, Judge.

This appeal arises from a legal malpractice suit filed by Walter Clough against attorney Thomas E. Richelo and his law firm, Richelo, Morrissey & Wright, P.C. (collectively, "Richelo"). Richelo filed a motion with the DeKalb County Superior Court to disqualify Clough's attorney, A. Todd Merolla, and Merolla's law firm, Raiford & Dixon, LLP, from representing Clough in the malpractice litigation. The trial court granted Richelo's motion, and Clough appeals,[1] contend

130

ing the court abused its discretion in disqualifying Merolla and the law firm. We find the trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying Merolla and, therefore, reverse. The challenge to the disqualification of the law firm, however, is moot.

By way of background, the record in this case shows that, in 1994, Clough worked as a sales consultant for Main Line Corporation and Noe Santamarina (collectively, "Main Line"). Three years later, Clough directed Main Line to begin making commission payments to Clough Marketing Services, Inc. ("CMS"), which he had recently incorporated in Georgia. Clough's wife owned 100 percent of the shares of CMS. In 1999, Clough sued Main Line in the Fulton County Superior Court, seeking to recover over $1,200,000 in sales commissions (hereinafter, the "Main Line suit"). Clough hired Richelo to represent him in the Main Line suit, and Richelo filed the suit, naming both Clough and CMS as plaintiffs.

In March 2002, while the Main Line suit was still pending, Clough's wife moved to another state and asked Clough for a divorce. Richelo attempted to mediate the couple's disagreement regarding how to proceed with the Main Line suit so that he could continue to represent both Clough and CMS as joint plaintiffs in the suit. Richelo notified the couple that he could not proceed with the Main Line suit until they resolved their disagreement over how to proceed with the suit. In January 2003, Richelo advised Clough that Clough might not have an individual claim against Main Line and that a jury could find that any award from the Main Line suit would be payable only to CMS and its sole shareholder, Clough's wife. Richelo then notified Clough that, unless Clough signed a new agreement that would allow him to continue to represent both Clough and CMS as joint plaintiffs, he (Richelo) was going to withdraw from his representation of Clough, but was going to continue to represent CMS in the Main Line suit. Clough refused to sign the agreement.

Clough retained another attorney, Merolla, who called Richelo in June 2003 and demanded that he withdraw from his representation of CMS in the Main Line suit and return the case files to Clough so Merolla could prepare for trial. According to Clough, Richelo refused to withdraw as CMS's counsel and refused to return Clough's files unless Clough paid him approximately $15,000 in outstanding legal expenses. Clough filed a motion to compel the return of the files with the Fulton County Superior Court. Richelo withdrew from the Main Line case in July 2003, but did not return Clough's case files. The Fulton County court granted Clough's motion to compel in December 2003.

Clough then filed the instant action against Richelo in DeKalb County, claiming that Richelo had committed legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and...
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Alexandra Gonzalez-Waddington is an Augusta GA divorce lawyer & Georgia Military Divorce Lawyer Augusta Georgia domestic mediator. She is an Augusta military divorce lawyer - Georgia military divorce attorney GA child custody attorney , and Augusta Georgia child support attorney. She offers mediation for divorce, child custody, and child support.

Augusta GA Military Divorce Attorney - Wynn Resorts CEO's $114 Million Sale

2009-08-19T23:11:00.000-04:00

Wynn Resorts CEO's $114 Million Sale
BY MIRIAM GOTTFRIED

CASINOS WERE HIT HARD by the recession, but Wynn Resorts (ticker: WYNN) shares have more than tripled from a March low. Now Steve and Elaine Wynn have cashed in some of that jackpot with a whopping $114 million stock sale to raise cash ahead of their impending divorce.
The couple sold two million shares of the company's common stock on Aug. 14 at an average price of $57 per share. Steve Wynn is Wynn Resorts' chairman and chief executive officer and Elaine Wynn is a director ...
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Alexandra Gonzalez-Waddington is an Augusta GA divorce lawyer & Georgia Military Divorce Lawyer Augusta Georgia domestic mediator. She is an Augusta military divorce lawyer - Georgia military divorce attorney GA child custody attorney , and Augusta Georgia child support attorney. She offers mediation for divorce, child custody, and child support.

Augusta Georgia Divorce Lawyer - HALEY v. HALEY

2009-08-17T10:09:00.000-04:00

Augusta Georgia Divorce Lawyer
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282 Ga. 204

HALEY v. HALEY.

S07A0241.

Sears, Chief Justice.

In this child support modification action, the parties entered into a settlement agreement in which the appellant, Mr. Haley, agreed to increase his child support payments from $750 per month per child for two children to $2,700 per month for one child. The parties, however, were unable to resolve Ms. Haley's claim that Mr. Haley should reimburse her for up to $40,848 in attorney fees. Thus, the agreement provided as follows: "The issue of Ms. Haley's claim for expenses and attorney fees will be submitted to [the trial judge] by brief for decision by the Court. Mr. Haley will not seek from Ms. Haley expenses of litigation or attorney fees."

In subsequently ruling on Ms. Haley's claim for attorney fees, the trial court determined that Ms. Haley "prevailed" on her child support modification action,[1] and awarded Ms. Haley $16,150 in attorney fees. We granted Mr. Haley's application to appeal to consider whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to Ms. Haley. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the parties' settlement agreement authorized the trial court to make the award in question.

Although Mr. Haley contends that Ms. Haley's claim for attorney fees is controlled by OCGA § 19-6-19 (d),[2] we conclude that Ms. Haley's claim for attorney fees rests not on OCGA § 19-6-19 (d) but rather on the parties' contract.[3] In this regard, the attorney fee clause in the settlement agreement makes no reference to OCGA § 19-6-19 (d). Moreover, by agreeing to submit the attorney fees issue to the trial court for resolution, we conclude that the parties authorized the trial court to exercise its discretion to consider whatever factors it found to be relevant to determine if Ms. Haley was entitled to attorney fees, including whether she was a prevailing party in the litigation. Moreover, if, in the exercise of the foregoing discretion, the court determined that Ms. Haley was entitled to attorney fees, we also conclude that the parties authorized the court to award her attorney fees in an amount the court found to be appropriate and reasonable under the circumstances.

Finally, under the facts of the present case, we conclude that the trial court did not err either in determining that Ms. Haley was the prevailing party or in awarding her $16,150 in attorney fees. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Carley, J., who concurs in the judgment only, and Melton, J., who dissents.

Hunstein, Presiding Justice, concurring.

I concur fully in the majority's opinion that the trial court was authorized to award Ms. Haley attorney fees under the settlement agreement provision in issue in this case. While this resolution renders dicta any discussion of OCGA § 19-6-19 (d), I write separately to reject the dissent's position that an award of attorney fees to Ms. Haley as the prevailing party in this modification of child support proceeding would not be proper under that statute.

Nothing in OCGA § 19-6-19 (d) precludes an award of attorney fees to a party who prevails in the settlement of a modification of alimony proceeding. "In proceedings for the modification of alimony for the support of a spouse or child pursuant to the provisions of this Code section, the court may award attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses of litigation to the prevailing party as the interests of justice may require." Id.[4] Modification proceedings resolved by settlement rather than by trial are not excluded or otherwise singled out for different treatment under this language. The sole limitation set forth in the statute is that the award reflect "the interests of justice," a legislative requirement that would be seriously compromised by the dissent's proposed interpretation of the statute.

Nor does Shapiro v. Lipman, 259 Ga. 85 (377 SE2d 673) (1989) support the dissent's position. Shapiro merely holds that when a modification of alimony proceeding is tried before a jury, the "prevailing party" for purposes of an award of attorney fees under OCGA § 19-6-19 (d) is determined by the jury's verdict, not by the trial court. Shapiro did not address and thus does not serve as authority for the dissent's claim that trial courts are prohibited from awarding attorney fees under OCGA § 19-6-19 (d) to parties who prevail in modification proceedings resolved by settlement rather than by trial.

Finally, policy considerations weigh against the dissent's position in light of the disincentive it provides for former spouses to resolve their differences by any means other than trial. The special treatment the law gives domestic relations cases reflects the unfortunate reality that ex-spouses rarely handle their conflicts with the disinterested arm's-length objectivity seen in commercial law cases. Instead of promoting the settlement of disputes over alimony, the dissent would exacerbate the bitter battles that too often follow divorce by adding attorney fees, costs and expenses of litigation to the list of contested items that the parties would have to address before an agreement outside of the courtroom could be reached.

For these reasons and consistent with the plain language of the statute, I would recognize that where a modification of alimony proceeding is settled by the parties, the trial court is authorized under OCGA § 19-6-19 (d) to determine whether one party prevailed and, if so, whether the interests of justice require that attorney fees, costs and expenses of litigation be awarded to the prevailing party.

Melton, Justice, dissenting.

It is well settled that a statutory or contractual basis must exist to authorize an award of attorney fees. See Cason v. Cason, 281 Ga. 296 (3) (637 SE2d 716) (2006). Here, there is neither. The language of the settlement agreement at issue does not authorize an award of attorney fees to Ms. Haley, and the parties' settlement of Ms. Haley's underlying child support modification claim, coupled with Mr. Haley's express refusal to waive any defenses to Ms. Haley's attorney fees claim, precluded the trial court from awarding attorney fees to Ms. Haley as the "prevailing party" pursuant to OCGA § 19-6-19 (d). Ms. Haley does not identify any other legal basis upon which she can rest her claim for attorney fees. Because the majority allows Ms. Haley to recover attorney fees where she has neither a contractual right to such fees nor a legal right to the fees as a "prevailing party" pursuant to OCGA § 19-6-19 (d), and because such a holding undermines the goals of parties settling cases in order to bring about an end to

their disputes, I must respectfully dissent.

The language of the settlement agreement itself does not provide an independent and affirmative basis for the award of attorney fees. The settlement agreement states only that "[t]he issue of Ms. Haley's claim for expenses and attorney fees will be submitted to [the trial judge] by brief for decision by the Court." The agreement does not concede that attorney fees are legally available, nor does it state that the parties are only disputing the amount of attorney fees in issue. There is nothing in the language of the agreement to even suggest that Mr. Haley is waiving any legal defenses that he might assert as to whether attorney fees are available in the first instance. To the contrary, by stating that "the issue of Ms. Haley's claim" for attorney fees would be considered by the court, the agreement indicates that the issue of attorney fees had been joined as to both availability and the amount of fees due (if any). The parties simply did not agree about whether Ms. Haley was legally or factually entitled to any attorney fees.

Indeed, contrary to the majority's reasoning, the plain language of the settlement agreement is entirely consistent with the fact that Mr. Haley did not waive any defenses to Ms. Haley's attorney fee claim by settling the underlying child support modification case with her. Mr. Haley consistently argued below that Ms. Haley could not collect attorney fees as a "prevailing party" as a matter of law,[5] which is highlighted by his June 5, 2006 response to a supplemental brief filed by Ms. Haley. In this supplemental brief, Mr. Haley states that

he has not waived any argument objecting to the Court's determination of the prevailing party in this instance by his agreement to submit "the issue of attorneys' fees and expenses" to the Court. The parties have merely agreed to submit the issue of attorneys' fees and expenses to the Court, and no party has made a specific waiver of any argument against such an award. The Defendant specifically did agree to very broad language in order to preserve all of his arguments against such an award.

Even after the trial court ultimately awarded attorney fees to Ms. Haley as the "prevailing party," Mr. Haley expressly argued once more that Ms. Haley was not the prevailing party as a matter of law. The issue of Ms. Haley's legal entitlement to attorney fees was not waived below, and it is properly before this Court on appeal.

The majority opinion overlooks the merits of Mr. Haley's contention regarding OCGA § 19-6-19 (d) and misconstrues the plain language of the parties' settlement agreement. In doing so, the majority dilutes the need for a court to first find an affirmative legal basis for the award of attorney fees by broadly asserting that the settlement agreement authorized the trial court to "consider whatever factors it found to be relevant to determine if Ms. Haley was entitled to attorneys fees." Where, as here, the agreement does not expressly and independently authorize the trial court to award attorney fees, the trial court must first determine the legal threshold question of whether attorney fees are otherwise legally available. In this regard, the trial court has no discretion. The court must consider this question. Only after the trial court identifies a legal basis for the award of attorney fees is it appropriate for the trial court to exercise its discretion to determine the amount of fees to award. "Although OCGA § 19-6-19 (d) gives the court discretion whether to award attorney fees to a prevailing party, it does not authorize the court to designate who is the prevailing party. That determination is made by the trier of fact [on the underlying claim]." (Emphasis in original.) Shapiro v. Lipman, 259 Ga. 85, 85-86 (377 SE2d 673) (1989). Here, Ms. Haley's initial request for attorney fees was made in the context of her counterclaim for child support modification and long before any settlement was reached. In this request, she states that she "is entitled to recover of [sic] [Mr. Haley] her expenses of litigation, including attorney fees, if she prevails." However, once a settlement was reached that resolved Ms. Haley's underlying child support claim without the assistance of a trier of fact, the trial court could no longer have any role in resolving that underlying claim on the merits. Thus, the settlement of the underlying claim removed any means for the trial court to determine who the "prevailing party" was in the lawsuit, which precluded any award of attorney fees. Id.; OCGA § 19-6-19 (d). The fact that the parties' settlement agreement makes no mention of OCGA § 19-6-19 (d) does not mean that the parties are not legally bound by the statute's requirements or that they did not intend for the statute to apply. Nor would the language of the settlement agreement authorize Ms. Haley to ignore the effect that settling her child support modification case would naturally have on her attorney fees claim.

Moreover, the result reached by the majority is inconsistent with the goals of settlement as a means of bringing about an end to contentious disputes. Settlement is reached as a result of compromise, and it allows both parties to be saved from spending the further time and expense of litigating the underlying claim. As this Court has held for over a hundred years,

[t]he law favors a settlement of differences and a compromise of disputed claims between parties. It . . . saves the time, expense, and trouble of litigation. It matters not if one party be right and the other wrong touching the validity of the original claim. The real consideration is in bringing about a settlement, preventing further annoyance, uncertainty and doubt, and to avoid, it may be, the uncertain results of a vexatious, troublesome, and expensive litigation. As far as our investigation has extended, the authorities are uniform and unbroken to the effect that when there is an honest difference of opinion between parties touching a disputed claim, and especially if the difference is of such a nature as to render it at all doubtful as to who is correct, any settlement or compromise of these differences will be enforced by the courts, and neither party will be allowed to defend by showing that he was right in his original contention.

Tyson v. Woodruff, 108 Ga. 368, 372 (33 SE 981) (1899).

Here, Ms. Haley placed her attorney fee claim in issue, and then made the choice to settle the case in a manner that allowed her to recover addition child support. At the same time, Mr. Haley settled the underlying child support modification claim without waiving any defenses to Ms. Haley's attorney fee claim. Each party compromised something in order to bring about an end to the dispute. As such, unless the parties otherwise agreed (which they did not here), there could be no "prevailing party" following the settlement. See id. Because the parties' settlement of Ms. Haley's underlying child support claim eliminated any basis upon which the trial court could determine who the "prevailing party" was in this case, neither the trial court nor this Court is authorized to declare that Ms. Haley was the prevailing party. Under the majority's analysis, however, even when one party to a settlement agreement is legally correct that the other party to the agreement is not entitled to an award of attorney fees, and even when a settlement agreement is drafted to ensure that no valid legal defenses to an attorney fee claim have been waived, a settling party who requests attorney fees but who is not legally entitled to receive them may still obtain them. Contrary to the purpose of settlement to "prevent[ ] further annoyance, uncertainty and doubt, and to avoid . . . the uncertain results of a vexatious, troublesome, and expensive litigation" regardless of who may or may not be right about the underlying claim, the majority ensures that litigation, even on issues that were legally foreclosed by the settlement, will continue. Id. Here, Ms. Haley agreed to settle her underlying child support modification claim in a manner that foreclosed her ability to obtain attorney fees as a matter of law. She cannot now be rewarded, after such an agreement, with a windfall of attorney fees that she is not entitled to based on the consequences of the settlement agreement that she freely chose to enter. Because the majority erroneously allows such a windfall in contravention of the settlement agreement and OCGA § 19-6-19 (d), I must dissent.

Decided June 25, 2007.Alexandra Gonzalez-Waddington is an Augusta GA divorce lawyer & Georgia Military Divorce Lawyer Augusta Georgia domestic mediator. She is an Augusta military divorce lawyer - Georgia military divorce attorney GA child custody attorney , and Augusta Georgia child support attorney. She offers mediation for divorce, child custody, and child support.

Columbus GA Child Custody Lawyer - DOUGLAS, v. DOUGLAS

2009-08-14T09:16:00.000-04:00

DOUGLAS,
v.
DOUGLAS

S09A0363

Supreme Court of Georgia

June 15, 2009

CARLEY, Justice

Gary Douglas (Father) and Elizabeth Douglas (Mother) were divorced in 1999. The final divorce decree awarded custody of the couple's one-year-old son to Father. Two years later, the Department of Family and Children's Services filed a petition in juvenile court, alleging that the child was deprived and seeking temporary custody. Prior to the final hearing on the petition, Father and Mother entered into an agreement to transfer custody of the child to Mother. After a hearing, the juvenile court incorporated the agreement into an order that transferred custody to Mother, provided for visitation by Father, and relieved the Department of any further custodial obligations.

Six years later, Father filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in superior court, contending that the child should be returned to him because the juvenile court order awarded only temporary custody to Mother and has expired, and that

2

he is still the child's legal custodian pursuant to the divorce decree. The habeas court denied the petition, finding that Mother is the legal custodian by virtue of the juvenile court order incorporating the agreement to change custody. Father appeals.

1. Father claims that the habeas court erred in finding that Mother has legal custody of the child pursuant to the juvenile court order. Juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases in which a child is alleged to be deprived. OCGA §15-11-28 (a) (1) (C). In this case, the juvenile court had authority to exercise its exclusive original jurisdiction because there was a bona fide allegation that the child was deprived. See In re K.L.H., 281 Ga. App. 394, 395-396 (636 SE2d 117) (2006). In such a deprivation proceeding, the juvenile court may award temporary custody to another parent, but it does not have authority to grant permanent custody absent a transfer order from the superior court. OCGA § 15-11-28 (c) (1); In the Interest of C.F., 199 Ga. App. 858, 859 (1) (406 SE2d 279) (1991); In the Interest of C.C., 193 Ga. App. 120, 121 (1) (387 SE2d 46) (1989). Because the issue of permanent custody or modification of the divorce decree was not transferred to the juvenile court from the superior court, the juvenile court could only grant temporary custody to Mother in the

3

deprivation proceeding. Accordingly, the habeas court erred when it concluded that the juvenile court had awarded permanent custody to Mother.

Moreover, the juvenile court's order, which disposed of the Department's deprivation proceeding, expired as a matter of law two years after it was entered. OCGA § 15-11-58.1 (a); In the Interest of A.J., 269 Ga. App. 580, 581, fn. 2 (604 SE2d 635) (2004). Because Mother's temporary custody has expired, the habeas court erred when it concluded that she has legal custody of the child and that Father's claim of unlawful detainment of the child is not viable. See Wood v. McGee, 241 Ga. 242, 243 (244 SE2d 846) (1978).

2. Father further contends that the habeas court order amounts to an improper change of custody in violation of the Georgia Child Custody Intrastate Jurisdiction Act of 1978 (the Act). OCGA § 19-9-20 et seq. Prior to passage of the Act, habeas corpus was an appropriate process by which to seek a change of child custody. See Matthews v. Matthews, 238 Ga. 201 (232 SE2d 76) (1977); Tyree v. Jackson, 226 Ga. 690, 692 (1) (177 SE2d 160) (1970). However, the Act, which became effective in January of 1979, now specifically prohibits the use of a complaint in the nature of habeas corpus to seek a change of child custody. OCGA § 19-9-23 (d); Munday v. Munday, 243 Ga. 863 (257

4

SE2d 283) (1979). Instead, the Act mandates that "any complaint seeking to obtain a change of legal custody of the child shall be brought as a separate action in the county of residence of the legal custodian of the child." OCGA § 19-9-23 (a).

Although habeas corpus can no longer be used to seek a change in child custody, it can still be used by a legal custodian seeking to enforce a child custody order. See Alvarez v. Sills, 258 Ga. 18-19 (365 SE2d 97) (1988). However, even where a legal custodian brings such a habeas action, no complaint seeking to change custody may be made "[a]s a counterclaim or in any other manner in response to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to enforce a child custody order. . . ." OCGA § 19-9-23 (c) (1). This Court's decision in Hutto v. Hutto, 250 Ga. 116 (296 SE2d 549) (1982) is consistent with this statutory prohibition against a change of custody claim being raised in response to a habeas action brought to enforce a child custody order.

In Hutto, the mother, who had legal custody, filed a habeas action for the return of her daughter from the father, who had physical custody. The habeas court exercised its discretion, considered the best interests of the child and awarded custody to the father. Hutto v. Hutto, supra at 117. This Court

5

reversed, noting that "[OCGA § 19-9-24 (a)] provides that in no case, whether by complaint or by counterclaim in response to a habeas petition, shall the physical custodian . . . `be allowed to maintain against the legal custodian any action for . . . change of child custody so long as custody of the child is withheld from the legal custodian in violation of that custody order.'" (Emphasis omitted.) Hutto v. Hutto, supra. This Court then held that the habeas court erred in allowing "the physical custodian to present evidence and essentially maintain an action [to change custody] against the legal custodian even though he was withholding custody of the child from the mother . . . in violation of the custody order. . . ." Hutto v. Hutto, supra.

The instant case is similar to Hutto, in that Father is the legal custodian pursuant to the divorce decree, and he properly brought a habeas action to enforce that decree. In response, Mother may not maintain an action to change custody based merely on changed circumstances. Rather, the habeas action must be resolved under the standard set forth in Dein v. Mossman, 244 Ga. 866, 868 (1) (262 SE2d 83) (1979). In that case, this Court cited the discretion given to habeas courts to determine custody under what is now OCGA § 9-14-2, and then explained that

6

"[t]he trial court, upon hearing a writ of habeas corpus for the detention of a child, is vested with a discretion in determining to whom its custody shall be given. Such discretion should be governed by the rules of law, and be exercised in favor of the party having the prima facie legal right to custody of the child unless the evidence shows that such person has lost the right to custody through one of the ways recognized in [OCGA §§ 19-7-1 and 19-7-4], or through unfitness." [Cits.] (Emphasis supplied.)
Dein v. Mossman, supra at 868 (1).

The dissent incorrectly claims that the habeas court should not apply the Dein v. Mossman standard, and should instead use the standard set forth in Dearman v. Rhoden, 235 Ga. 457, 458 (3) (219 SE2d 704) (1975), which would allow for a change of custody based on changed circumstances. The dissent's reliance on Dearman is misplaced because it was decided prior to the effective date of the Act. Since that case was decided when it was still appropriate to seek a change of custody in a habeas proceeding, the standard it used, considering a change in circumstances, is not applicable to this case, in which the legal custodian is simply seeking to enforce a child custody order.

Rather, as directed by Dein v. Mossman, the habeas court in this case should have exercised its discretion in favor of Father, as legal custodian, unless he has lost his right to custody through unfitness or one of the legal grounds set

7

forth in OCGA §§ 19-7-1 and 19-7-4, such as voluntary contract releasing parental rights, consent to adoption, failure to provide necessaries, abandonment, or cruel treatment. See Columbus v. Gaines, 253 Ga. 518, 5195-20 (322 SE2d 259) (1984) (habeas court affirmed where it denied father's petition for custody of daughter because he contracted away parental rights, failed to provide necessities and abandoned child, and was unfit as a parent). Nevertheless, "[i]t should be noted that the [mother] is not without recourse as [she] may file the proper complaint seeking a change in custody of the child in [the county of residence of the legal custodian]." Hutto v. Hutto, supra at 118.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Benham, J., who dissents.
Alexandra Gonzalez-Waddington is an Augusta GA divorce lawyer & Georgia Military Divorce Lawyer Augusta Georgia domestic mediator. She is an Augusta military divorce lawyer - Georgia military divorce attorney GA child custody attorney , and Augusta Georgia child support attorney. She offers mediation for divorce, child custody, and child support.

What are the grounds for divorce in Georgia?

2009-08-13T17:29:00.001-04:00

What are the grounds for divorce in Georgia?

In Georgia there are 13 grounds for divorce. One ground is irretrievably broken (sometimes referred to as the no-fault ground). The other 12 grounds for divorce in Georgia are fault grounds.

What is a no-fault divorce?
To obtain a divorce on this basis (irretrievably broken), one party must establish that he or she refuses to live with the other spouse and that there is no hope of reconciliation. It is not necessary for both parties to agree the marriage is irretrievably broken. Also, it is not necessary to show that there was any fault or wrongdoing by either party.

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Augusta GA Military Divorce Lawyer - Experts tackle divorce: Does 'don't get mad, get everything' still ring true?

2009-08-11T11:42:00.001-04:00

Experts tackle divorce: Does 'don't get mad, get everything' still ring true?
Tuesday, August 11th 2009, 4:00 AM

Roca/News
Donald Trump and girlfriend Melania Knauss are joined by Trump's former wife, Ivana.
Don’t get mad. Get everything!” Ivana Trump famously declared during the 1990s. Even for New Yorkers not leading lifestyles of the rich and famous, handling finances during a divorce can be just as tough.
Manhattan restaurateur Noel Firth, 41, learned the hard way, going back and forth endlessly with his wife’s divorce lawyer from 2004 to 2006.
The father of four worked constantly — as an NYPD sergeant, then as a bodyguard for former Mayor Rudy Giuliani’s consulting firm — so his kids “could live in a nice house in Westchester.”
Divorce proceedings get so heated because they determine quality of life, said Manhattan divorce lawyer June Jacobson.
“It’s about whether the kids should go to private school or public school. It could be about scaling back life choices — ‘Should we be taking cabs or the subway?’” she said.
Firth’s lawyer, John O’Donnell, added: “The problem comes in when one spouse has assets and the other doesn’t. You might have a wife who’s a stay-at-home mom and the husband may have several retirement plans, including a pension and 401(k). He might not want her to have any portion. She knows she’s entitled to a portion.”
Among the most complicated situations involve clarifying whether real estate is marital property or separate.

Read more: http://www.nydailynews.com/money/2009/08/11/2009-08-11_experts_tackle_divorce_does_dont_get_mad_get_everything_still_ring_true.html#ixzz0NtDixfMI

Alexandra Gonzalez-Waddington is an Augusta GA divorce lawyer & Georgia Military Divorce Lawyer Augusta Georgia domestic mediator. She is an Augusta military divorce lawyer - Georgia military divorce attorney GA child custody attorney, and Augusta Georgia child support attorney. She offers mediation for divorce, child custody, and child support.

Divorce lawyer in Augusta GA

2009-08-06T20:05:00.001-04:00

Augusta GA Divorce lawyer http://ping.fm/9G2vJ

2009-08-06T20:04:00.001-04:00

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Military Divorce Fort Gordon - Augusta GA - SPROUSE v. SPROUSE

2009-08-06T11:20:00.001-04:00

2009-GA-0602.107
SPROUSE v. SPROUSE
SPROUSE
v.
SPROUSE.

S09F0709.

Supreme Court of Georgia

June 1, 2009

CARLEY, Justice.

John Michael Sprouse (Husband) and Joyce Hamilton Sprouse (Wife) entered a common law marriage in Alabama in 1996. That marriage was terminated in 2001 by the divorce decree of an Alabama court. Shortly thereafter, the parties resumed cohabitation, and they were ceremonially married on March 5, 2005. Husband brought this divorce action on January 2, 2007, and Wife answered and counterclaimed. After a bench trial, the trial court entered a final divorce decree which, in relevant part, awarded alimony to Wife in the amount of $1,000 per month for six months or until she begins receiving social security disability benefits, whichever first occurs, at which time the amount would decrease to $500 per month and last for twelve and one-half years. The trial court denied a motion for new trial, and Husband applied for a discretionary appeal, which was granted pursuant to our Pilot Project in divorce cases.

2

Husband contends that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding alimony that was excessive as to amount and duration and was not based on the evidence adduced at trial.

"In the absence of any mathematical formula, fact-finders are given a wide latitude in fixing the amount of alimony . . . and to this end they are to use their experience as enlightened persons in judging the amount necessary for support under the evidence as disclosed by the record and all the facts and circumstances of the case." [Cit.]
Arkwright v. Arkwright, 284 Ga. 545, 546 (2) (a) (668 SE2d 709) (2008).

Husband argues that the trial court did not thoroughly examine all of the relevant statutory factors in determining alimony. See OCGA § 19-6-5 (a). However, "`[w]ith respect to alimony, there is no statutory requirement that findings be included in the decree.' [Cit.]" Wood v. Wood, 283 Ga. 8, 9 (1) (a) (655 SE2d 611) (2008). Although the trial court at one point expressed some concern over the potential redundancy of additional testimony, that testimony was not excluded, and "there is nothing in the record to show the trial court did not take into account the evidence . . . adduced at trial. . . ." Southerland v. Southerland, 278 Ga. 188, 190 (2) (598 SE2d 442) (2004). Moreover, the transcript shows many questions and comments by the trial court, several of which indicate that the court considered Wife's needs, Husband's ability to pay,

3

and the factors set forth in OCGA § 19-6-5 (a). See OCGA § 19-6-1 (c); Arkwright v. Arkwright, supra at 546-547 (2) (a); Wood v. Wood, supra.

Contrary to Husband's further assertion, we do not read any of the trial court's comments as revealing that it had prejudged the issue of alimony. "[T]he trial judge heard the case without a jury and, thus, would not need to use the same qualified and circumspect language as he would in the context of a jury trial." Kephart v. Kephart, 273 Ga. 9, 10 (3) (536 SE2d 504) (2000). Husband also complains that the trial court considered a self-serving letter written by the attorney representing Wife in her social security disability case. However, even assuming that the letter was inadmissible, the transcript does not show that the trial court relied upon that letter and, "[a]t a bench trial such as this, `the trial court is presumed to have separated admissible evidence from inadmissible evidence and considered only the former in reaching its judgment.' [Cit.]" Thomas v. State, 284 Ga. 540, 545 (2) (668 SE2d 711) (2008).

Husband further contends that the trial court abused its discretion by considering the length of time the parties lived together in a meretricious relationship prior to their marriage in 2005. After expressing an intent to award Wife alimony for 13 years, the trial court stated that the parties "have been

4

together for 13 years and she doesn't appear to have anything. I'm going to do that that way and then it stops." When Husband argued that Georgia does not recognize "palimony," the trial court explained that the length of the marriage is not dispositive. OCGA § 19-6-5 (a) (2) lists the "duration of the marriage" as one factor which must be considered in determining the amount of alimony. Such a statutory criterion has been held not to include either premarital cohabitation or prior marriages between the parties. Loughlin v. Loughlin, 910 A2d 963, 974 (Conn. 2006). However, in addition to several specific factors, OCGA § 19-6-5 (a) gives the factfinder broad discretion to consider "such other relevant factors as the court deems equitable and proper." OCGA § 19-6-5 (a) (8). See also Wood v. Wood, supra; Rieffel v. Rieffel, 281 Ga. 891, 892 (1) (644 SE2d 140) (2007). "We see no reason why that discretion necessarily excludes considering the length of the parties' premarital cohabitation." Marriage of Lind, 139 P3d 1032, 1040 (III) (Or. App. 2006). We hold that, under the catchall provision of OCGA § 19-6-5 (a) (8), the trial "court is free to consider the parties' entire relationship, including periods of premarital cohabitation," in determining alimony. Harrelson v. Harrelson, 932 P2d 247, 255 (III) (C) (1) (Alaska 1997). Moreover, no one factor is dispositive, and the

5

trial court did not rely solely on the total length of the parties' relationship. See Marriage of Lind, supra at 1041 (III).

Based on the entire record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making its award of alimony to Wife. See Arkwright v. Arkwright, supra at 547 (2) (a); Wood v. Wood, supra.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

GA

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Augusta GA Military Divorce Attorney - IN RE ESTATE OF SMITH

2009-08-06T10:45:00.000-04:00

2009-GA-0604.181
IN RE ESTATE OF SMITH
IN RE ESTATE OF ROBERT L. SMITH.

A09A0278.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

June 3, 2009

DOYLE, Judge.

Robert Lewis Smith died intestate. Ann Olds filed a petition for letters of administration with the probate court, claiming that she was Robert's wife.(fn1)

After the probate court entered a "Final Order" appointing Ann as the administrator of the estate and issuing Letters of Administration, Timothy Smith -- one of Robert's sons -- filed a motion to set aside the order, contending that Ann was not Robert's surviving spouse. Following an evidentiary hearing, the probate court entered an order finding that there was no common-law marriage between Robert and Ann, setting aside the order appointing Ann as administrator of the estate and revoking the Letters of Administration issued to Ann. Ann challenges the probate court's ruling on appeal, and we affirm, for reasons that follow.

When an "alleged marriage is unlicensed and nonceremonial, the burden is on the proponent to prove that a common-law marriage existed."(fn2) Although Georgia does not recognize common-law marriages entered into after January 1, 1997, "[o]therwise valid common-law marriages entered into prior to January 1, 1997 . . . shall continue to be recognized in this state."(fn3) As the party asserting the existence of a common-law marriage, Ann "must establish its existence by a preponderance of the evidence."(fn4) Moreover, an order finding that no common-law marriage existed must be upheld on appeal if there is any evidence to support the finding.(fn5) "In order for a common[-]law marriage to come into existence, the parties must be able to contract, must agree to live together as man and wife, and must consummate the agreement. All three of these elements as set forth in OCGA § 19-3-1 must be met simultaneously."(fn6) Further, "[a] legal marital relationship cannot be partial or periodic."(fn7)

Here, Ann testified at the hearing that she and Robert began dating and moved in together in 1993. According to Ann, Robert wanted to marry her, but "he could not get married because he had a warrant out for his arrest . . . and he was afraid to really put his name on anything." Ann testified that she and Robert lived together as husband and wife, sharing finances and a bed, and raised their daughter together. According to Ann, she and Robert ceased living together for "a few months" in 1996, and they "separated a few times," but otherwise lived together "off and on" from 1993 until his death in 2006; Ann admitted on cross-examination that she had another boyfriend during a period of time in 2000 when she was separated from Robert. Ann also stated that "everybody in the Winder area and half of Athens that knows [them] knows [her] as [Robert's] wife."(fn8)

Timothy Smith also testified at the hearing, stating that his father never held himself out as Ann's husband and that Ann did not refer to herself as Robert's wife before his death. Bernice Smith testified that she married Robert in 1971 and thereafter filed for divorce in 1976; Robert later told Bernice that because he never signed the divorce papers, they were still legally married. According to Bernice, she did not know that she was divorced from Robert until she saw a copy of the divorce decree after his death. Bernice also testified that neither Ann nor Robert ever told her that they were married to each other.

At the hearing, Ann testified that Robert was the father of her daughter, Kristy B. Olds, but Robert is not listed as the father on Kristy's birth certificate.(fn9) The birth certificate lists an Athens address for Ann, who testified that she was living with "a girlfriend" at the time. Ann did not produce any of her tax returns, but testified that she filed her tax returns as single, head of household. Ann introduced a copy of a lease agreement "between Robert Smith and Ann Smith" and the landlord, which was executed by "Ann Smith" on February 1, 1996. Ann also introduced a copy of a 2006 power bill in Robert's name for an address on Spring Valley Road in Athens, as well as a sales slip from a furniture store for Robert with the same Spring Valley Road address,(fn10) which was signed by "Ann Olds," and a separate bill from the same store dated 2006 that listed both Robert and "Ann Smith" as the account holders. Ann also submitted vehicle registration records from the Georgia Motor Vehicle Division for three cars (dated 2006 and 2005), two of which listed Robert as the owner -- at the Spring Valley Road address -- and one which listed "Ann Gale Olds" as the owner, also at the Spring Valley Road address. The property manager for the Spring Valley Road address sent a demand for possession of the property after Robert's death, listing Robert only, not Ann. Finally, Robert's death certificate lists "Ann Conner" as his spouse.

In its final order, the trial court concluded that because Ann did not produce a copy of the divorce decree dissolving Robert's prior marriage to Bernice, Ann "failed to establish that Mr. R. Smith had the requisite capacity to contract marriage with . . . Olds." The trial court also found that although Ann presented evidence and testimony that she lived with Robert between 1993 until his death, "[a] majority of her evidence . . . is dated after January 1, 1997, on which date common-law marriage ceased to be recognized in [Georgia]" and that "[t]aking the record as a whole, the residential lease [from 1996] is not enough to overcome the weight of the evidence against common-law marriage."

Pretermitting whether there was sufficient evidence submitted that Robert and Bernice were officially divorced, the remaining evidence is conflicting as to whether Robert and Ann entered into a common-law marriage. While Ann presented some evidence of her purported common-law marriage to Robert before 1997, evidence to the contrary also exists, including that Ann and Robert separated numerous times, Ann had a boyfriend during one such separation, she filed income tax returns as a single person, and she did not list Robert as the father on Kristy's birth certificate or give her daughter Robert's last name. In addition, Ann was the only witness who testified in support of her common-law marriage; the remaining witnesses -- Bernice and Timothy -- testified that neither Ann nor Robert held themselves out as husband and wife.

It is well-settled that we must affirm a factfinder's determination regarding whether a common-law marriage exists if there is any evidence to support the finding.(fn11) Thus, "`although the evidence is in conflict, there exists some evidence to support the trial court's finding of the nonexistence of a common law marriage, and we will not disturb that finding on appeal.'"(fn12)

Judgment affirmed.

Blackburn, P.J., and Adams, J., concur.

_____________________
Footnotes:

FN1. Ann also filed a wrongful death action as Robert's surviving spouse and on behalf of his four surviving children and his estate.

FN2. (Punctuation omitted.) In re Estate of Love, 274 Ga. App. 316, 319 (1) (618 SE2d 97) (2005).

FN3. OCGA § 19-3-1.1.

FN4. Dismuke v. C & S Trust Co., 261 Ga. 525, 526 (1) (407 SE2d 739) (1991).

FN5. See In re Estate of Wilson, 236 Ga. App. 496, 499 (1) (j) (512 SE2d 383) (1999).

FN6. (Punctuation omitted.) In re Estate of Love, 274 Ga. App. at 319 (1).

FN7. In re Estate of Dunn, 236 Ga. App. 211, 213 (2) (b) (511 SE2d 575) (1999).

FN8. Ann did not, however, present a witness to confirm this assertion.

FN9. In its order, the probate court stated that there was a paternity test being conducted in the superior court in the wrongful death case to determine whether Kristy was the biological child of Robert.

FN10. The year on the sales receipt is cut off, but it clearly begins with "20."

FN11. See In re Estate of Wilson, 236 Ga. App. at 489-499 (1) (j); Frazier v. State, 219 Ga. App. 768, 770 (1) (467 SE2d 338) (1996).

FN12. In re Estate of Wilson, 236 Ga. App. at 499 (1) (j). See also Jordan v. State, 267 Ga. 442, 446 (2) (480 SE2d 18) (1997) (no marriage where evidence equivocal); In re Estate of Dunn, 236 Ga. App. at 212-213 (2) (b) (no common-law marriage where evidence conflicting); Frazier, 219 Ga. App. at 770 (1) (no marriage found in light of conflicting evidence).

GA

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Augusta GA Military Divorce Lawyer - Uncontested divorce attorney

2009-07-27T15:37:00.002-04:00

Divorce hurts health even after remarriage

By Jeanna Bryner - MSNBC

Divorce can wreak havoc on a person's health, even after remarriage, a new study finds.

Scientists have known that marriage can boost a man's health and augment a women's purse. The new study shows that divorce or losing a spouse to death can exact an immediate and long-lasting toll on those mental and physical gains.

"That period during the time that this event is taking place is extremely stressful," said study researcher Linda Waite, a sociologist and director of the Center on Aging at the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago. "People ignore their health; they're stressed, which is itself a health risk; they're less likely to go to the doctor; they're less likely to exercise; they're sleeping poorly."

It turns out, once you have tarnished your health, it's hard to snap back, even if you tie the knot again.

"Remarriage helps. It puts you back on a healthy trajectory," Waite told LiveScience. "But it puts you back on a healthy trajectory from a lower point, because you didn't take care of yourself for a year."

Finding that divorce and spousal death had similar impacts on a person's health suggests divorce operates like a traumatic event in one's life, according to Waite.

Mark Hayward of the University of Texas at Austin, who was not invovled in the study, agreed.

"The acuteness of stress surrounding a divorce could operate a lot like a trauma as opposed to years and years of low-grade stress," said Hayward, who is also the director of the university's Population Research Center.

The new study "suggests much of health can be altered by these major turning points in one's life, like divorce, from which one doesn't recover," Hayward said.

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Columbus GA Divorce Lawyer - Columbus Uncontested Divorce Attorney

2009-07-11T21:59:00.001-04:00

What is alimony in Georgia?

Alimony is a payment, often monthly but sometimes yearly, that one former spouse makes to the other. Sometimes alimony is awarded in a lump sum. If it is paid as a regular payment, it generally ends if the receiving spouse remarries or dies. Alimony is supposed to support the receiving spouse. The issue of alimony is often why one spouse will file an at fault divorce suit – when a judge rules one spouse caused the divorce, either through infidelity or some other contributing factor, that spouse is generally not entitled to alimony.
A judge will look at several factors to determine the appropriate amount of alimony, including how long the couple was married, if one spouse spent time out of his or her career path raising the children while the other worked, and how much each spouse earns, or has the potential to earn.

Scot Sikes is a Columbus GA divorce lawyer & Georgia Military Divorce Lawyer Columbus Georgia domestic mediator. He is an Columbus military divorce lawyer - Georgia military divorce attorney GA child custody attorney , and Columbus Georgia child support attorney. He offers mediation for divorce, child custody, and child support.

Augusta GA Military Divorce Lawyer - Uncontested divorce attorney

2009-06-27T09:09:00.001-04:00

New Trials in Divorce Cases - Georgia

Uncontested divorce lawyer - Augusta GA

TITLE 19. DOMESTIC RELATIONS
CHAPTER 5. DIVORCE

O.C.G.A. § 19-5-14 (2008)

§ 19-5-14. New trials

New trials may be granted in actions for divorce as in other cases.

HISTORY: Orig. Code 1863, § 1679; Code 1868, § 1722; Code 1873, § 1723; Code 1882, § 1723; Civil Code 1895, § 2441; Civil Code 1910, § 2960; Code 1933, § 30-130.

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Augusta GA Military Divorce Lawyer - Non contested divorce attorney

2009-06-27T09:08:00.000-04:00

Georgia Domestic / Divorce Practice Rules

TITLE 19. DOMESTIC RELATIONS
CHAPTER 5. DIVORCE

O.C.G.A. § 19-5-8 (2008)

§ 19-5-8. Pleading and practice

The same rules of pleading and practice applicable to ordinary civil actions shall apply to actions for divorce, alimony, and custody of minor children, except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter. No verdict or judgment by default shall be taken in any such case but the allegations of the pleadings shall be established to the satisfaction of the court by the verified pleadings, by affidavit, by evidentiary hearing, or otherwise, as provided in Code Section 19-5-10.

HISTORY: Ga. L. 1895, p. 44, § 9; Civil Code 1895, §§ 2440, 5074; Civil Code 1910, §§ 2959, 5658; Code 1933, § 30-113; Ga. L. 1958, p. 315, § 1; Ga. L. 1967, p. 226, § 44; Ga. L. 1987, p. 565, § 1.

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About us

2008-11-03T08:31:00.001-05:00

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Alexandra Gonzalez-Waddington is an Augusta GA divorce lawyer & Georgia Military Divorce Lawyer Augusta Georgia domestic mediator. She is an Augusta military divorce lawyer - Georgia military divorce attorney GA child custody attorney , and Augusta Georgia child support attorney. She offers mediation for divorce, child custody, and child support.

Military Divorce in Georgia - Augusta Georgia Divorce Lawyer

2008-08-14T17:11:00.001-04:00

Divorce in Georgia

The increase in divorce has its effect, directly or indirectly, on virtually every family in the country. The following information is designed to summarize briefly Georgia's divorce laws.

Marriage is a civil contract which the state has an interest in preserving. Accordingly, the marriage relationship can be dissolved only as provided by law, by either a divorce or an annulment. It also may be altered by a decree of separation granted by our courts. In any case, there must be a proceeding in the Superior Court of the county in which the person seeking the divorce, separation decree or annulment must prove "grounds" or valid reasons prescribed by law.

What are the grounds for divorce in Georgia?

In Georgia there are 13 grounds for divorce. One ground is "irretrievably broken" (sometimes referred to as the "no-fault" ground). The other 12 grounds for divorce in Georgia are "fault" grounds.

What is a "no-fault" divorce?

To obtain a divorce on this basis (irretrievably broken), one party must establish that he or she refuses to live with the other spouse and that there is no hope of reconciliation. It is not necessary to show that there was any fault or wrongdoing by either party.

What are the "fault" grounds?

To obtain a divorce on one of the 12 "fault" grounds, one must prove that there was some wrongdoing by one of the parties to the marriage.

As an example, one fault ground is adultery. Adultery in Georgia includes heterosexual and homosexual relations between one spouse and another individual.

Another "fault" ground for divorce in Georgia is desertion. A divorce may be granted on the grounds that a person has deserted his or her spouse willfully for at least a year. Other "fault" grounds include mental or physical cruel treatment, marriage between persons who are too closely related, mental incapacity at the time of marriage, impotency at the time of marriage, force or fraud in obtaining the marriage, pregnancy of the wife unknown to the husband at the time of the marriage, conviction and imprisonment for certain crimes, habitual intoxication or drug addiction, and mental illness.

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Georgia Military Divorce Attorney & Georgia Lawyer

2008-08-14T17:05:00.000-04:00

Military Divorces & Family Law Issues

We specialize in military related family law issues. We are experienced in dealing with legal issues that arise during military service. All members of our firm have spent years either on Active Duty as JAG lawyers or as Active Duty military dependants. Our lawyers have handled hundreds of military related divorces, GA & SC criminal cases involving service members and their dependants, court martials cases, and a variety of other family law issues such as custody issues, child support, adoptions, service of process, and annulments.

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Georgia Military Divorce Lawyer & Augusta Military Divorce Attorney

2008-08-14T16:36:00.001-04:00

Our family law attorneys serve the Augusta, GA and Evans, GA area. Our attorneys offer representation in the areas of divorce, child custody disputes, child support modification, paternity, adoptions, military divorce and family law issues, and premarital agreements. Our staff is available to serve our clients in an attentive and personal manner. The firm's attorneys emphasize a strong working relationship with their clients. They specialize in family law, particularly in the area of divorce and provide representation in the following areas:

Divorce in Georgia - Child Support Modification
Child Custody Disputes - Paternity
Adoptions - Military Divorces & Military Family Law Issues
Our family law attorneys provide representation with compassion and expertise. We understand the struggles and pain that people encounter when dealing with Family law issues. We believe that you should be treated with courtesy and respect; you should be informed at all stages of your representation and should participate in the decision making process at all times.

We work in the Augusta Georgia, Evans Georgia areas and are familiar with the local judges and the local court system. Whether you are going through a contested divorce, uncontested divorce, child support modification, child custody dispute, child visitation modification, military divorce, or adoption, our local Augusta Georgia lawyers will support you at every step of the way.

Divorce
Our Georgia divorce lawyers understand Georgia Family laws on the issues of child custody, child support, alimony, property distribution and pension rights. If you are considering filing for divorce or are already a party to a divorce, contact our lawyers to discuss the best way to proceed. Our attorneys will explain the differences between an uncontested divorce and a contested divorce. We will advise you in a caring and professional manner on the best way to gain custody of your children, set up agreeable child visitation arrangements, establish fair child support, as well as represent you in any alimony disputes.

Adoptions
If you are considering adopting a child in Georgia, then our lawyers can help. We will guide you through the wonderful experience of adopting a child, and make the process as pleasant as possible.

Paternity
Paternity frequently comes up in a Georgia divorce where the parties are not sure of parentage. The determination of paternity is usually aided by blood or DNA testing. The most important thing to remember is that you only get one chance to litigate the issue of paternity. Once the issue is necessary to the pending litigation, it is a final determination of the issue between the parties, whether it is hotly contested, or ignored.

The best time to seek legal advice is before signing any papers presented to you by another party. You may be signing away important legal rights. If you receive correspondence from the government, or are served with legal papers, and are unsure as to what to do, seek legal advice immediately.

If you are a new mother, or expecting soon, don't wait to seek legal advice. Blood tests are not always necessary to obtain temporary relief, and you may get some help even before the child is born, including any and all medical costs associated with a pregnancy.

Alexandra Gonzalez-Waddington is an Augusta GA divorce lawyer & Georgia Military Divorce Lawyer Augusta Georgia domestic mediator. She is an Augusta military divorce lawyer - Georgia military divorce attorney GA child custody attorney , and Augusta Georgia child support attorney. She offers mediation for divorce, child custody, and child support.