Military Divorce Fort Gordon - Augusta GA - SPROUSE v. SPROUSE
2009-GA-0602.107
SPROUSE v. SPROUSE
SPROUSE
v.
SPROUSE.
S09F0709.
Supreme Court of Georgia
June 1, 2009
CARLEY, Justice.
John Michael Sprouse (Husband) and Joyce Hamilton Sprouse (Wife) entered a common law marriage in Alabama in 1996. That marriage was terminated in 2001 by the divorce decree of an Alabama court. Shortly thereafter, the parties resumed cohabitation, and they were ceremonially married on March 5, 2005. Husband brought this divorce action on January 2, 2007, and Wife answered and counterclaimed. After a bench trial, the trial court entered a final divorce decree which, in relevant part, awarded alimony to Wife in the amount of $1,000 per month for six months or until she begins receiving social security disability benefits, whichever first occurs, at which time the amount would decrease to $500 per month and last for twelve and one-half years. The trial court denied a motion for new trial, and Husband applied for a discretionary appeal, which was granted pursuant to our Pilot Project in divorce cases.
2
Husband contends that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding alimony that was excessive as to amount and duration and was not based on the evidence adduced at trial.
"In the absence of any mathematical formula, fact-finders are given a wide latitude in fixing the amount of alimony . . . and to this end they are to use their experience as enlightened persons in judging the amount necessary for support under the evidence as disclosed by the record and all the facts and circumstances of the case." [Cit.]
Arkwright v. Arkwright, 284 Ga. 545, 546 (2) (a) (668 SE2d 709) (2008).
Husband argues that the trial court did not thoroughly examine all of the relevant statutory factors in determining alimony. See OCGA § 19-6-5 (a). However, "`[w]ith respect to alimony, there is no statutory requirement that findings be included in the decree.' [Cit.]" Wood v. Wood, 283 Ga. 8, 9 (1) (a) (655 SE2d 611) (2008). Although the trial court at one point expressed some concern over the potential redundancy of additional testimony, that testimony was not excluded, and "there is nothing in the record to show the trial court did not take into account the evidence . . . adduced at trial. . . ." Southerland v. Southerland, 278 Ga. 188, 190 (2) (598 SE2d 442) (2004). Moreover, the transcript shows many questions and comments by the trial court, several of which indicate that the court considered Wife's needs, Husband's ability to pay,
3
and the factors set forth in OCGA § 19-6-5 (a). See OCGA § 19-6-1 (c); Arkwright v. Arkwright, supra at 546-547 (2) (a); Wood v. Wood, supra.
Contrary to Husband's further assertion, we do not read any of the trial court's comments as revealing that it had prejudged the issue of alimony. "[T]he trial judge heard the case without a jury and, thus, would not need to use the same qualified and circumspect language as he would in the context of a jury trial." Kephart v. Kephart, 273 Ga. 9, 10 (3) (536 SE2d 504) (2000). Husband also complains that the trial court considered a self-serving letter written by the attorney representing Wife in her social security disability case. However, even assuming that the letter was inadmissible, the transcript does not show that the trial court relied upon that letter and, "[a]t a bench trial such as this, `the trial court is presumed to have separated admissible evidence from inadmissible evidence and considered only the former in reaching its judgment.' [Cit.]" Thomas v. State, 284 Ga. 540, 545 (2) (668 SE2d 711) (2008).
Husband further contends that the trial court abused its discretion by considering the length of time the parties lived together in a meretricious relationship prior to their marriage in 2005. After expressing an intent to award Wife alimony for 13 years, the trial court stated that the parties "have been
4
together for 13 years and she doesn't appear to have anything. I'm going to do that that way and then it stops." When Husband argued that Georgia does not recognize "palimony," the trial court explained that the length of the marriage is not dispositive. OCGA § 19-6-5 (a) (2) lists the "duration of the marriage" as one factor which must be considered in determining the amount of alimony. Such a statutory criterion has been held not to include either premarital cohabitation or prior marriages between the parties. Loughlin v. Loughlin, 910 A2d 963, 974 (Conn. 2006). However, in addition to several specific factors, OCGA § 19-6-5 (a) gives the factfinder broad discretion to consider "such other relevant factors as the court deems equitable and proper." OCGA § 19-6-5 (a) (8). See also Wood v. Wood, supra; Rieffel v. Rieffel, 281 Ga. 891, 892 (1) (644 SE2d 140) (2007). "We see no reason why that discretion necessarily excludes considering the length of the parties' premarital cohabitation." Marriage of Lind, 139 P3d 1032, 1040 (III) (Or. App. 2006). We hold that, under the catchall provision of OCGA § 19-6-5 (a) (8), the trial "court is free to consider the parties' entire relationship, including periods of premarital cohabitation," in determining alimony. Harrelson v. Harrelson, 932 P2d 247, 255 (III) (C) (1) (Alaska 1997). Moreover, no one factor is dispositive, and the
5
trial court did not rely solely on the total length of the parties' relationship. See Marriage of Lind, supra at 1041 (III).
Based on the entire record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making its award of alimony to Wife. See Arkwright v. Arkwright, supra at 547 (2) (a); Wood v. Wood, supra.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
GA
Slip OpinionsAlexandra Gonzalez-Waddington is an Augusta GA divorce lawyer & Georgia Military Divorce Lawyer Augusta Georgia domestic mediator. She is an Augusta military divorce lawyer - Georgia military divorce attorneyGA child custody attorney , and Augusta Georgia child support attorney. She offers mediation for divorce, child custody, and child support.
SPROUSE v. SPROUSE
SPROUSE
v.
SPROUSE.
S09F0709.
Supreme Court of Georgia
June 1, 2009
CARLEY, Justice.
John Michael Sprouse (Husband) and Joyce Hamilton Sprouse (Wife) entered a common law marriage in Alabama in 1996. That marriage was terminated in 2001 by the divorce decree of an Alabama court. Shortly thereafter, the parties resumed cohabitation, and they were ceremonially married on March 5, 2005. Husband brought this divorce action on January 2, 2007, and Wife answered and counterclaimed. After a bench trial, the trial court entered a final divorce decree which, in relevant part, awarded alimony to Wife in the amount of $1,000 per month for six months or until she begins receiving social security disability benefits, whichever first occurs, at which time the amount would decrease to $500 per month and last for twelve and one-half years. The trial court denied a motion for new trial, and Husband applied for a discretionary appeal, which was granted pursuant to our Pilot Project in divorce cases.
2
Husband contends that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding alimony that was excessive as to amount and duration and was not based on the evidence adduced at trial.
"In the absence of any mathematical formula, fact-finders are given a wide latitude in fixing the amount of alimony . . . and to this end they are to use their experience as enlightened persons in judging the amount necessary for support under the evidence as disclosed by the record and all the facts and circumstances of the case." [Cit.]
Arkwright v. Arkwright, 284 Ga. 545, 546 (2) (a) (668 SE2d 709) (2008).
Husband argues that the trial court did not thoroughly examine all of the relevant statutory factors in determining alimony. See OCGA § 19-6-5 (a). However, "`[w]ith respect to alimony, there is no statutory requirement that findings be included in the decree.' [Cit.]" Wood v. Wood, 283 Ga. 8, 9 (1) (a) (655 SE2d 611) (2008). Although the trial court at one point expressed some concern over the potential redundancy of additional testimony, that testimony was not excluded, and "there is nothing in the record to show the trial court did not take into account the evidence . . . adduced at trial. . . ." Southerland v. Southerland, 278 Ga. 188, 190 (2) (598 SE2d 442) (2004). Moreover, the transcript shows many questions and comments by the trial court, several of which indicate that the court considered Wife's needs, Husband's ability to pay,
3
and the factors set forth in OCGA § 19-6-5 (a). See OCGA § 19-6-1 (c); Arkwright v. Arkwright, supra at 546-547 (2) (a); Wood v. Wood, supra.
Contrary to Husband's further assertion, we do not read any of the trial court's comments as revealing that it had prejudged the issue of alimony. "[T]he trial judge heard the case without a jury and, thus, would not need to use the same qualified and circumspect language as he would in the context of a jury trial." Kephart v. Kephart, 273 Ga. 9, 10 (3) (536 SE2d 504) (2000). Husband also complains that the trial court considered a self-serving letter written by the attorney representing Wife in her social security disability case. However, even assuming that the letter was inadmissible, the transcript does not show that the trial court relied upon that letter and, "[a]t a bench trial such as this, `the trial court is presumed to have separated admissible evidence from inadmissible evidence and considered only the former in reaching its judgment.' [Cit.]" Thomas v. State, 284 Ga. 540, 545 (2) (668 SE2d 711) (2008).
Husband further contends that the trial court abused its discretion by considering the length of time the parties lived together in a meretricious relationship prior to their marriage in 2005. After expressing an intent to award Wife alimony for 13 years, the trial court stated that the parties "have been
4
together for 13 years and she doesn't appear to have anything. I'm going to do that that way and then it stops." When Husband argued that Georgia does not recognize "palimony," the trial court explained that the length of the marriage is not dispositive. OCGA § 19-6-5 (a) (2) lists the "duration of the marriage" as one factor which must be considered in determining the amount of alimony. Such a statutory criterion has been held not to include either premarital cohabitation or prior marriages between the parties. Loughlin v. Loughlin, 910 A2d 963, 974 (Conn. 2006). However, in addition to several specific factors, OCGA § 19-6-5 (a) gives the factfinder broad discretion to consider "such other relevant factors as the court deems equitable and proper." OCGA § 19-6-5 (a) (8). See also Wood v. Wood, supra; Rieffel v. Rieffel, 281 Ga. 891, 892 (1) (644 SE2d 140) (2007). "We see no reason why that discretion necessarily excludes considering the length of the parties' premarital cohabitation." Marriage of Lind, 139 P3d 1032, 1040 (III) (Or. App. 2006). We hold that, under the catchall provision of OCGA § 19-6-5 (a) (8), the trial "court is free to consider the parties' entire relationship, including periods of premarital cohabitation," in determining alimony. Harrelson v. Harrelson, 932 P2d 247, 255 (III) (C) (1) (Alaska 1997). Moreover, no one factor is dispositive, and the
5
trial court did not rely solely on the total length of the parties' relationship. See Marriage of Lind, supra at 1041 (III).
Based on the entire record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making its award of alimony to Wife. See Arkwright v. Arkwright, supra at 547 (2) (a); Wood v. Wood, supra.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
GA
Slip OpinionsAlexandra Gonzalez-Waddington is an Augusta GA divorce lawyer & Georgia Military Divorce Lawyer Augusta Georgia domestic mediator. She is an Augusta military divorce lawyer - Georgia military divorce attorneyGA child custody attorney , and Augusta Georgia child support attorney. She offers mediation for divorce, child custody, and child support.
Augusta GA Military Divorce Attorney - IN RE ESTATE OF SMITH
2009-GA-0604.181
IN RE ESTATE OF SMITH
IN RE ESTATE OF ROBERT L. SMITH.
A09A0278.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
June 3, 2009
DOYLE, Judge.
Robert Lewis Smith died intestate. Ann Olds filed a petition for letters of administration with the probate court, claiming that she was Robert's wife.(fn1)
After the probate court entered a "Final Order" appointing Ann as the administrator of the estate and issuing Letters of Administration, Timothy Smith -- one of Robert's sons -- filed a motion to set aside the order, contending that Ann was not Robert's surviving spouse. Following an evidentiary hearing, the probate court entered an order finding that there was no common-law marriage between Robert and Ann, setting aside the order appointing Ann as administrator of the estate and revoking the Letters of Administration issued to Ann. Ann challenges the probate court's ruling on appeal, and we affirm, for reasons that follow.
When an "alleged marriage is unlicensed and nonceremonial, the burden is on the proponent to prove that a common-law marriage existed."(fn2) Although Georgia does not recognize common-law marriages entered into after January 1, 1997, "[o]therwise valid common-law marriages entered into prior to January 1, 1997 . . . shall continue to be recognized in this state."(fn3) As the party asserting the existence of a common-law marriage, Ann "must establish its existence by a preponderance of the evidence."(fn4) Moreover, an order finding that no common-law marriage existed must be upheld on appeal if there is any evidence to support the finding.(fn5) "In order for a common[-]law marriage to come into existence, the parties must be able to contract, must agree to live together as man and wife, and must consummate the agreement. All three of these elements as set forth in OCGA § 19-3-1 must be met simultaneously."(fn6) Further, "[a] legal marital relationship cannot be partial or periodic."(fn7)
Here, Ann testified at the hearing that she and Robert began dating and moved in together in 1993. According to Ann, Robert wanted to marry her, but "he could not get married because he had a warrant out for his arrest . . . and he was afraid to really put his name on anything." Ann testified that she and Robert lived together as husband and wife, sharing finances and a bed, and raised their daughter together. According to Ann, she and Robert ceased living together for "a few months" in 1996, and they "separated a few times," but otherwise lived together "off and on" from 1993 until his death in 2006; Ann admitted on cross-examination that she had another boyfriend during a period of time in 2000 when she was separated from Robert. Ann also stated that "everybody in the Winder area and half of Athens that knows [them] knows [her] as [Robert's] wife."(fn8)
Timothy Smith also testified at the hearing, stating that his father never held himself out as Ann's husband and that Ann did not refer to herself as Robert's wife before his death. Bernice Smith testified that she married Robert in 1971 and thereafter filed for divorce in 1976; Robert later told Bernice that because he never signed the divorce papers, they were still legally married. According to Bernice, she did not know that she was divorced from Robert until she saw a copy of the divorce decree after his death. Bernice also testified that neither Ann nor Robert ever told her that they were married to each other.
At the hearing, Ann testified that Robert was the father of her daughter, Kristy B. Olds, but Robert is not listed as the father on Kristy's birth certificate.(fn9) The birth certificate lists an Athens address for Ann, who testified that she was living with "a girlfriend" at the time. Ann did not produce any of her tax returns, but testified that she filed her tax returns as single, head of household. Ann introduced a copy of a lease agreement "between Robert Smith and Ann Smith" and the landlord, which was executed by "Ann Smith" on February 1, 1996. Ann also introduced a copy of a 2006 power bill in Robert's name for an address on Spring Valley Road in Athens, as well as a sales slip from a furniture store for Robert with the same Spring Valley Road address,(fn10) which was signed by "Ann Olds," and a separate bill from the same store dated 2006 that listed both Robert and "Ann Smith" as the account holders. Ann also submitted vehicle registration records from the Georgia Motor Vehicle Division for three cars (dated 2006 and 2005), two of which listed Robert as the owner -- at the Spring Valley Road address -- and one which listed "Ann Gale Olds" as the owner, also at the Spring Valley Road address. The property manager for the Spring Valley Road address sent a demand for possession of the property after Robert's death, listing Robert only, not Ann. Finally, Robert's death certificate lists "Ann Conner" as his spouse.
In its final order, the trial court concluded that because Ann did not produce a copy of the divorce decree dissolving Robert's prior marriage to Bernice, Ann "failed to establish that Mr. R. Smith had the requisite capacity to contract marriage with . . . Olds." The trial court also found that although Ann presented evidence and testimony that she lived with Robert between 1993 until his death, "[a] majority of her evidence . . . is dated after January 1, 1997, on which date common-law marriage ceased to be recognized in [Georgia]" and that "[t]aking the record as a whole, the residential lease [from 1996] is not enough to overcome the weight of the evidence against common-law marriage."
Pretermitting whether there was sufficient evidence submitted that Robert and Bernice were officially divorced, the remaining evidence is conflicting as to whether Robert and Ann entered into a common-law marriage. While Ann presented some evidence of her purported common-law marriage to Robert before 1997, evidence to the contrary also exists, including that Ann and Robert separated numerous times, Ann had a boyfriend during one such separation, she filed income tax returns as a single person, and she did not list Robert as the father on Kristy's birth certificate or give her daughter Robert's last name. In addition, Ann was the only witness who testified in support of her common-law marriage; the remaining witnesses -- Bernice and Timothy -- testified that neither Ann nor Robert held themselves out as husband and wife.
It is well-settled that we must affirm a factfinder's determination regarding whether a common-law marriage exists if there is any evidence to support the finding.(fn11) Thus, "`although the evidence is in conflict, there exists some evidence to support the trial court's finding of the nonexistence of a common law marriage, and we will not disturb that finding on appeal.'"(fn12)
Judgment affirmed.
Blackburn, P.J., and Adams, J., concur.
_____________________
Footnotes:
FN1. Ann also filed a wrongful death action as Robert's surviving spouse and on behalf of his four surviving children and his estate.
FN2. (Punctuation omitted.) In re Estate of Love, 274 Ga. App. 316, 319 (1) (618 SE2d 97) (2005).
FN3. OCGA § 19-3-1.1.
FN4. Dismuke v. C & S Trust Co., 261 Ga. 525, 526 (1) (407 SE2d 739) (1991).
FN5. See In re Estate of Wilson, 236 Ga. App. 496, 499 (1) (j) (512 SE2d 383) (1999).
FN6. (Punctuation omitted.) In re Estate of Love, 274 Ga. App. at 319 (1).
FN7. In re Estate of Dunn, 236 Ga. App. 211, 213 (2) (b) (511 SE2d 575) (1999).
FN8. Ann did not, however, present a witness to confirm this assertion.
FN9. In its order, the probate court stated that there was a paternity test being conducted in the superior court in the wrongful death case to determine whether Kristy was the biological child of Robert.
FN10. The year on the sales receipt is cut off, but it clearly begins with "20."
FN11. See In re Estate of Wilson, 236 Ga. App. at 489-499 (1) (j); Frazier v. State, 219 Ga. App. 768, 770 (1) (467 SE2d 338) (1996).
FN12. In re Estate of Wilson, 236 Ga. App. at 499 (1) (j). See also Jordan v. State, 267 Ga. 442, 446 (2) (480 SE2d 18) (1997) (no marriage where evidence equivocal); In re Estate of Dunn, 236 Ga. App. at 212-213 (2) (b) (no common-law marriage where evidence conflicting); Frazier, 219 Ga. App. at 770 (1) (no marriage found in light of conflicting evidence).
GA
Slip Opinions
Alexandra Gonzalez-Waddington is an Augusta GA divorce lawyer & Georgia Military Divorce Lawyer Augusta Georgia domestic mediator. She is an Augusta military divorce lawyer - Georgia military divorce attorneyGA child custody attorney , and Augusta Georgia child support attorney. She offers mediation for divorce, child custody, and child support.
IN RE ESTATE OF SMITH
IN RE ESTATE OF ROBERT L. SMITH.
A09A0278.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
June 3, 2009
DOYLE, Judge.
Robert Lewis Smith died intestate. Ann Olds filed a petition for letters of administration with the probate court, claiming that she was Robert's wife.(fn1)
After the probate court entered a "Final Order" appointing Ann as the administrator of the estate and issuing Letters of Administration, Timothy Smith -- one of Robert's sons -- filed a motion to set aside the order, contending that Ann was not Robert's surviving spouse. Following an evidentiary hearing, the probate court entered an order finding that there was no common-law marriage between Robert and Ann, setting aside the order appointing Ann as administrator of the estate and revoking the Letters of Administration issued to Ann. Ann challenges the probate court's ruling on appeal, and we affirm, for reasons that follow.
When an "alleged marriage is unlicensed and nonceremonial, the burden is on the proponent to prove that a common-law marriage existed."(fn2) Although Georgia does not recognize common-law marriages entered into after January 1, 1997, "[o]therwise valid common-law marriages entered into prior to January 1, 1997 . . . shall continue to be recognized in this state."(fn3) As the party asserting the existence of a common-law marriage, Ann "must establish its existence by a preponderance of the evidence."(fn4) Moreover, an order finding that no common-law marriage existed must be upheld on appeal if there is any evidence to support the finding.(fn5) "In order for a common[-]law marriage to come into existence, the parties must be able to contract, must agree to live together as man and wife, and must consummate the agreement. All three of these elements as set forth in OCGA § 19-3-1 must be met simultaneously."(fn6) Further, "[a] legal marital relationship cannot be partial or periodic."(fn7)
Here, Ann testified at the hearing that she and Robert began dating and moved in together in 1993. According to Ann, Robert wanted to marry her, but "he could not get married because he had a warrant out for his arrest . . . and he was afraid to really put his name on anything." Ann testified that she and Robert lived together as husband and wife, sharing finances and a bed, and raised their daughter together. According to Ann, she and Robert ceased living together for "a few months" in 1996, and they "separated a few times," but otherwise lived together "off and on" from 1993 until his death in 2006; Ann admitted on cross-examination that she had another boyfriend during a period of time in 2000 when she was separated from Robert. Ann also stated that "everybody in the Winder area and half of Athens that knows [them] knows [her] as [Robert's] wife."(fn8)
Timothy Smith also testified at the hearing, stating that his father never held himself out as Ann's husband and that Ann did not refer to herself as Robert's wife before his death. Bernice Smith testified that she married Robert in 1971 and thereafter filed for divorce in 1976; Robert later told Bernice that because he never signed the divorce papers, they were still legally married. According to Bernice, she did not know that she was divorced from Robert until she saw a copy of the divorce decree after his death. Bernice also testified that neither Ann nor Robert ever told her that they were married to each other.
At the hearing, Ann testified that Robert was the father of her daughter, Kristy B. Olds, but Robert is not listed as the father on Kristy's birth certificate.(fn9) The birth certificate lists an Athens address for Ann, who testified that she was living with "a girlfriend" at the time. Ann did not produce any of her tax returns, but testified that she filed her tax returns as single, head of household. Ann introduced a copy of a lease agreement "between Robert Smith and Ann Smith" and the landlord, which was executed by "Ann Smith" on February 1, 1996. Ann also introduced a copy of a 2006 power bill in Robert's name for an address on Spring Valley Road in Athens, as well as a sales slip from a furniture store for Robert with the same Spring Valley Road address,(fn10) which was signed by "Ann Olds," and a separate bill from the same store dated 2006 that listed both Robert and "Ann Smith" as the account holders. Ann also submitted vehicle registration records from the Georgia Motor Vehicle Division for three cars (dated 2006 and 2005), two of which listed Robert as the owner -- at the Spring Valley Road address -- and one which listed "Ann Gale Olds" as the owner, also at the Spring Valley Road address. The property manager for the Spring Valley Road address sent a demand for possession of the property after Robert's death, listing Robert only, not Ann. Finally, Robert's death certificate lists "Ann Conner" as his spouse.
In its final order, the trial court concluded that because Ann did not produce a copy of the divorce decree dissolving Robert's prior marriage to Bernice, Ann "failed to establish that Mr. R. Smith had the requisite capacity to contract marriage with . . . Olds." The trial court also found that although Ann presented evidence and testimony that she lived with Robert between 1993 until his death, "[a] majority of her evidence . . . is dated after January 1, 1997, on which date common-law marriage ceased to be recognized in [Georgia]" and that "[t]aking the record as a whole, the residential lease [from 1996] is not enough to overcome the weight of the evidence against common-law marriage."
Pretermitting whether there was sufficient evidence submitted that Robert and Bernice were officially divorced, the remaining evidence is conflicting as to whether Robert and Ann entered into a common-law marriage. While Ann presented some evidence of her purported common-law marriage to Robert before 1997, evidence to the contrary also exists, including that Ann and Robert separated numerous times, Ann had a boyfriend during one such separation, she filed income tax returns as a single person, and she did not list Robert as the father on Kristy's birth certificate or give her daughter Robert's last name. In addition, Ann was the only witness who testified in support of her common-law marriage; the remaining witnesses -- Bernice and Timothy -- testified that neither Ann nor Robert held themselves out as husband and wife.
It is well-settled that we must affirm a factfinder's determination regarding whether a common-law marriage exists if there is any evidence to support the finding.(fn11) Thus, "`although the evidence is in conflict, there exists some evidence to support the trial court's finding of the nonexistence of a common law marriage, and we will not disturb that finding on appeal.'"(fn12)
Judgment affirmed.
Blackburn, P.J., and Adams, J., concur.
_____________________
Footnotes:
FN1. Ann also filed a wrongful death action as Robert's surviving spouse and on behalf of his four surviving children and his estate.
FN2. (Punctuation omitted.) In re Estate of Love, 274 Ga. App. 316, 319 (1) (618 SE2d 97) (2005).
FN3. OCGA § 19-3-1.1.
FN4. Dismuke v. C & S Trust Co., 261 Ga. 525, 526 (1) (407 SE2d 739) (1991).
FN5. See In re Estate of Wilson, 236 Ga. App. 496, 499 (1) (j) (512 SE2d 383) (1999).
FN6. (Punctuation omitted.) In re Estate of Love, 274 Ga. App. at 319 (1).
FN7. In re Estate of Dunn, 236 Ga. App. 211, 213 (2) (b) (511 SE2d 575) (1999).
FN8. Ann did not, however, present a witness to confirm this assertion.
FN9. In its order, the probate court stated that there was a paternity test being conducted in the superior court in the wrongful death case to determine whether Kristy was the biological child of Robert.
FN10. The year on the sales receipt is cut off, but it clearly begins with "20."
FN11. See In re Estate of Wilson, 236 Ga. App. at 489-499 (1) (j); Frazier v. State, 219 Ga. App. 768, 770 (1) (467 SE2d 338) (1996).
FN12. In re Estate of Wilson, 236 Ga. App. at 499 (1) (j). See also Jordan v. State, 267 Ga. 442, 446 (2) (480 SE2d 18) (1997) (no marriage where evidence equivocal); In re Estate of Dunn, 236 Ga. App. at 212-213 (2) (b) (no common-law marriage where evidence conflicting); Frazier, 219 Ga. App. at 770 (1) (no marriage found in light of conflicting evidence).
GA
Slip Opinions
Alexandra Gonzalez-Waddington is an Augusta GA divorce lawyer & Georgia Military Divorce Lawyer Augusta Georgia domestic mediator. She is an Augusta military divorce lawyer - Georgia military divorce attorneyGA child custody attorney , and Augusta Georgia child support attorney. She offers mediation for divorce, child custody, and child support.